Back to Ambassadorial Speeches - Ambassador Zalman Shoval

AMBASSADOR ZALMAN SHOVAL: ADDRESS TO THE U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE NOVEMBER 2, 1999

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It's now one year since the signing of the Wye River Agreement; and while we speak - President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat are meeting in Oslo in order to try to get a handle on starting what one hopes is the final phase of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. How final this "final" phase will actually be - we shall have to wait and see. And lest we forget, it's also exactly eight years since the Madrid Conference; five years to the day that Israel and Jordan signed their peace agreement, an agreement which has actually worked very well. And if those dates aren't enough - November 2nd is also the date on which Great Britain made the Balfour Declaration, 82 years ago - so, the timing of today's event is really quite perfect! So, where are we today?

Well, the Barak government has now been in office for about four months - and though I would not presume to make a comprehensive resume - I shall try to list some of the more immediate issues on his plate.

One thing can be taken for granted - all that has happened so far was probably still relatively easy; now comes the really tough part. You know, there was a British Prime Minister, Baldwin, who said that there were three classes which need sanctuary more than others: birds, wildflowers and Prime Ministers. I don't want to get too much into Israeli domestic politics, though as Tip O'Neill said "all politics is local"; but I think that Barak realized that for Israel, unity is not just a political factor but also a strategic factor, and achieving unity isn't always easy - and that's an understatement. There is a play by the British playwright David Hare, not a very good play, I understand, but that play, "Via Dolorosa", contains a sentence which goes: "Every citizen of Jerusalem, every day of the year, has more political opinions than a Swede would have in a whole year" - which says a lot about Israeli politics, and I guess, Swedish politics as well... Anyway, Barak trying to move towards the center, was not motivated only by parliamentary arithmetics, but also by his realization that it is there, in the center that most of Israel's public opinion actually is. For, after all, the fact that there was a change of government in Israel, has not yet materially changed the basic calculus of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The issues are essentially the same whether the government is right, left or center. Of course, every leader has his own style, his own strategy, his own priorities, his own approach, his preferences, maybe even his own ideology - although most recent Israeli Prime Ministers, including Netanyahu and Barak have tended to be more pragmatic than ideological anyway.

And so, in the spirit of pragmatic pro-activism, from the very beginning, there was a determined effort by Barak to seize the political initiative - both with regards to the peace process - and perhaps no less importantly, with regards to Israel's all - important bilateral relationship with the U.S., and these two subjects are, of course, not unrelated. In this context, he has proposed to redefine the role the U.S. plays in the peace process. During the last few years, the U.S. had gradually exchanged its traditional - and I would say, usually very instrumental role as facilitators, go-betweens, intermediaries - into one of being almost judges and arbiters. This has not been helpful to the peace process - as our Arab partners, instead of feeling that they had to come to terms with Israel, believed that by negotiating with the U.S. they could induce the American "judge" to put pressure on Israel - and they, the Arabs, would then not need to compromise or make concessions of their own. Obviously this didn't work; on the contrary, it contributed to an atmosphere of continuous crisis. And, although the U.S. never shared this Palestinian perception - this situation could have had, and sometimes did have, a potentially negative effect also on the U.S.-Israeli bilateral relationship. So, I wouldn't go so far as to say that the U.S. will now actually exchange its "front seat" for a "back seat" in the process - but, as you know, some big cars have those folding seats in the middle...The Palestinian side, by the way, believing that their ties with the U.S. - as the New York Times wrote this week - have been "profitably strengthened" - during those years, and therefore, to quote the Times again, "do not see an advantage to being alone at the table with the Israelis", obviously has not been too happy with that - so, for instance, in the case of the recent "Sharm el-Sheikh" accord final agreement was held up till Secretary Albright and her staff were actually in the region.

I think that in order to put things in perspective, we should understand that both the Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements were signposts on the road to final destination - but not the destination itself. The Arab-Israeli peace process must be viewed as a continuum - starting with Camp David, and then the treaty with Egypt; thirteen years later Madrid; then "Oslo", and so on and so forth. And if you look at the progress of the process, each sequential agreement was intended as an improvement on the previous agreement. Oslo II was to correct some of the more serious faults of Oslo I, "Hebron" did the same with regards to both "Oslos"; "Wye" went a little further in trying to concretize the "Oslo" - commitments of both sides - and now there is Sharm el-Sheikh, which has been called "an improved Wye". In the meantime some of the matters agreed upon in "Wye", but left uncompleted, were completed after "Sharm" - prisoner release, additional Israeli troop redeployments, the so-called "safe passage" - about which it is still not so clear how safe it actually is, etc. - though Palestinian compliance of their commitments still leaves a lot to be desired. But to repeat, the basic issues have not yet been dealt with - such as how to reach those arrangements with Israel's neighbors - peace arrangements, peace agreements - which will open for the Palestinians the way to running their own lives within an agreed territorial and political entity - without however, endangering Israel's fundamental security concerns, and without jeopardizing her other national goals as well. Complicated? Yes, very complicated - but not insurmountable. And yes, security is, and will continue to be, uppermost on our minds - and, I am sorry to say, the Palestinian Authority's record in this matter has been somewhat patchy. As Barak often reminds his audience - in our region there is no pity for the weak - or as Henry Kissinger put it: there is no second chance for the defeated. Had Israel in the Six Day War been in the situation that Kuwait was in in the Gulf War - she would never have had a chance to come back after six months. There just wouldn't have been any Israelis left.

Thus, the issue in the talks with the Palestinians, and, of course, with Syria - if there will be talks with Syria - from Israel's point of view will still be how to establish real peace, peace with security, which goes beyond mere documents and treaties.

If we talk about the specific core issues - there is Jerusalem and Israel's sovereignty in its united capital. There is the urgent matter of water. Then there will be the question of how to determine the borders - which experience has taught us, and based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, must be very different from the pre- '67 provisional armistice lines. Geography and territory are vital factors in Israel's ability to defend itself. And the question of borders is, of course, closely related to the need to create contiguity between pre-'67 Israel and the large and strategically important settlement clusters or blocks on the West Bank.

One problem which indeed cannot and should not be left unheeded is that of the Palestinian refugees. It is a festering wound which has been left open far too long. I remember when, as a soldier in 1967, and then again in the Lebanese war of 1982, I saw the inhuman conditions in which some of those people lived in refugee-camps - often next to sumptuous villas - and I thought: How could those wealthy and well-established Arab societies so completely and cynically disregard the suffering of their own brethren - and not just disregard, but often perpetuate it for purely political or economic reasons? Only Jordan, to her credit, granted them citizenship and basic civil rights - none of the others. In Lebanon they are not only denied citizenship, but also the freedom to live where they choose. They may not attend public schools or seek treatment in state-run hospitals - and there are other indignities. In many of the Arab countries, Palestinians - and I mean second or third generation people born there - can also be thrown out overnight - as they were during the Gulf War. It was and is a situation difficult to grasp, certainly to accept - for, after all, while 4-500,000 Palestinian Arabs left the country as a result of the fighting in 1948 - shortly after, an even larger number of Jewish refugees from Arab countries reached Israel, an Israel which was barely able to survive, certainly economically - but which, with the help of Jewish communities all over the world - made it its primary mission to absorb and integrate them.

The Palestinian refugee problem is, therefore, a tragic, though largely artificial one. It shouldn't have existed by now, but it does and it cannot, realistically, be solved except by a joint effort of the Arab host-countries and other parts of the Arab world to grant their Palestinian brothers the permanent rights they should be entitled to - and of the international community to address the respective claims for financial compensation of both Arab and Jewish refugees - as well as addressing the need for financial compensation to the host-countries.

Let me also say this: whatever the exact outcome of the present and future negotiations with the Palestinians, whichever the legal or constitutional form of a future Palestinian entity - there should now be a major effort, including by the Arab countries, to build up the Palestinian economy - and I am aware of all the justified criticism of what I shall diplomatically refer to as that economy's lack of transparency and accountability; developing the Palestinian economy is vital not only in order to create jobs and give Palestinians hope for a better and thus less violent future - but no less important, to make the Palestinian economy less dependent on work in Israel - a situation which is not good for them or for us.

Ladies and Gentlemen: in a few days from now, November 7th, to be precise, "Permanent Status" talks with the Palestinians will begin. These negotiations will proceed in different channels - the most important of which will certainly be that farthest away from the public eye. But "Permanent status" is not just a legalistic term. I myself have been involved in Israel's efforts to make peace with our neighbors for the better part of my political life: I was involved with the late Moshe Dayan in Camp david, I was at the Madrid Conference, doing much of the ground work for that conference, and then a member of the Israeli delegation negotiating with Jordanians and the Palestinians. I participated in the Wye River Conference - not to mention my role as Israel's two-time - not two-timing - two-time ambassador to the U.S. And there have been ups and downs - though, in retrospect, perhaps more ups than downs. But, looking at the process, evaluating it, we sometimes ask ourselves: Why do so many Arab opinion-formers - intellectuals, lawyers, journalists - still seem to object to the idea of peace with the Jewish State? You may have seen the recent item about "black lists" being drawn up in Jordan castigating those who are "Israel's friends". And why is normalization still regarded as a prize, a boon only to Israel - and not as a natural outcome of peace, benefiting all peoples? I think that one of the reasons is that, though many in the Arab countries have agreed to "pragmatic" peace with Israel - for a combination of practical reasons - they still are not prepared for what has been termed "ideological" peace - peace as an aim in itself - and in our specific case, peace which recognizes not just Israel's de facto existence, but its right to exist. This has still not occurred, certainly not to the extent that it should.

Not that we should lose hope, on the contrary - history has shown in other parts of the world, in post-WWII Europe, for instance, that over time, "pragmatic" peace can eventually become "ideological" peace. In our part of the world, where everything takes longer anyway, it may take a generational change - but ultimately - if Israel remains strong and determined, and if Arab rulers will be more concerned with the welfare of their own peoples than with the sort of anti-Israeli rhetoric, and not just rhetoric, but actions as well, we, unfortunately, still hear and see, especially at the UN - peace, real, ideological peace, will eventually come. I also believe that with the help of the information-revolution, which is beginning to reach the Arab countries, giving everybody in the region greater access to knowledge about each other - a new generation of men and women will turn more and more towards peace, real peace - and, hopefully, be able to change also the attitudes of those of their political leaderships which sometimes seem reluctant to come to terms with the new realities in the world. And there are encouraging signs; as last week's establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and Israel may indicate - some Arab states are beginning to focus increasingly on their own national interests. Actually, the very term "Middle East" may today be no more than one of geographical convenience - it is a region of many diverse peoples, cultures, religions, history. Therefore, for instance, talks of integrating Israel or modern Turkey into the Middle East is misleading - Turkey looks primarily to Europe or to Central Asia, Israel looks mainly westward. But it may be this very diversity of interests and focuses which will bring about the lessening of the heated antagonisms which are often the result of what, for the lack of a better term, one might perhaps call "incestuous" political relationships.

Perhaps a word about Syria. How did Winston Churchill describe the Soviet Union? "A riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma"? Well, the same can probably be said about Syria. How to explain that though consecutive Israeli Prime Ministers, all Israeli Prime Ministers, have made major efforts to engage President Assad in serious peace talks - all those efforts, so far, have been to no avail? Yes, there has supposedly been an improved atmosphere in recent months - but as to the hard facts, the positions of Syria, one would be hard pressed to see an inkling of moderation. Quite frankly, the Syrian attitude is rather incomprehensible - one might almost call it "the banality of rejectionism"; if indeed they do want peace - and many experts, though not all, believe they do - how to explain Syria's position - for, after all, their left over bargaining chips if they think they are bargaining chips, are certainly not what they used to be. Syria is now the "odd man out" among Arab countries, with regards to Israel. Well, we shall just have to wait and see - but don't hold your breath yet.

Ladies and Gentlemen: I don't want to write myself into anyone's biography, although this seems to be fashionable these days, but I think that when Barak deliberated with himself about the respective advantages and disadvantages of the recent Sharm el-Sheikh , agreement, and the strict time-table which he set for the negotiations with the Palestinians - as well as perhaps with Syria and Lebanon, one of the things he probably said to himself was: whichever way things will develop we have to establish an even closer working-relationship with the Americans than before, close as it already was - especially considering the fact that the really important things in the peace process, the "end game", all those "core" issues which I mentioned, still lie ahead.

In this connection, as you know, the most important new element in the "Sharm" Accord, which was not there in the original "Wye River Agreement" Memorandum, is the aim to reach as early as February 2000 a "framework" agreement on the underlying principles for a future final agreement - with the terrible name "FAPS" (Framework Agreement on Permanent Status) - to pave the way to the permanent agreement to be reached by September 2000. That sort of timeline was not there in "Wye". And in between, there could be another "summit", perhaps in January. And nobody can say with absolute certainty when or if these agreements will in fact, be reached - though we are hopeful - but the solid bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Israel will be important in either case: whether there is agreement or, no less so, if not.

And if one talks about the close and ongoing U.S.-Israeli relationship, this must, anyway, go beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the peace process, with all their importance; it cannot ignore what is going on in the rest of the world.

And we are talking about a world which is still very far from having attained the "end of history". Nor will the millennium necessarily introduce an era of general peace and goodwill. You know, by the way, talking about the millennium - according to the Jewish calendar we still have 240 years. So, maybe we have more time! Be this as it may, in our part of the world, the Palestinian problem or the Arab-Israeli conflict, never were the sole or even the most important factors of instability. According to a study made by the U.S. Army War College published in 1992, out of 19 wars and armed conflicts in the wider Middle East since 1947, only four or five had anything to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict. By now, there have probably been three or four additional wars in the region which also had nothing to do with Israel. I mention this so as to underscore that, even as we all hope, Israel and the Palestinians, even Syria, will finally reach an agreement, the Middle East for years to come may still be a very dangerous neighborhood. And that, I am afraid, is not likely to change altogether just because Israelis and Palestinian Arabs, or Syrians, will come to a modus vivendi between them. But as the U.S. National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, has recently stated, that a stable Middle East is definitely a vital American interest, the enhanced strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel may be of greater importance than ever before.

Let me just mention one specific aspect of this enhanced relationship: missile defense. By the way, I am happy to say that yesterday there has been another successful, the seventh in a row, try-out of Israel's anti-missile missile, the "arrow". There are increasingly worrying threats from states like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea - all of which have developed, or are trying to develop, missile, nuclear and other non-conventional capabilities. Without an effective inspection program, for instance, Iraq could very well reacquire the capabilities it had in 1990 - which means it could develop nuclear weapons within 2 to 3 years. As to Iran, all sorts of expectations which we used to share in the past with regards to time-frames may have collapsed because of outside aid - mainly from Russia and North Korea.

Ladies and gentlemen: Israel has made great strides in the last few years in many fields and against great odds - not least in its economy. Fifty-one years ago we were barely at subsistence level, now our per capita GDP is approaching $20,000 - more than that of all the Arab countries surrounding us combined. And they have oil and we, supposedly, only milk and honey. We are one of the world leaders in high-tech, right behind the U.S.; we successfully overcame the pitfalls of the global economic crisis. Inflation is down. The budget deficit is down. Foreign investment in 1998 was higher than ever before and growth is once again beginning to pick up. And this is only about the economy - I don't mention all the rest, like successfully absorbing one million Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union within the span of five, six years - and there is a new, growing, wave of immigrants from Russia gathering right now. Of course, we have also had failures - some of them are still with us, and there will be problems which we chose in the past to ignore - but, what we and our neighbors still need is wider peace. Real peace, not just formal, contractual peace. Peace which engages both the minds and the hearts of people - not just the agendas of diplomats. We are not there yet. Is there a "new" Middle East? Again, not yet. But I believe there is a chance now that we shall get there.

And if the Middle East should then be a more boring place, so be it.

Thank you.

U.S. Institute of Peace, November 2, 1999 Page 6/6