Back to Ambassadorial Speeches - Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich

Remarks by Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich at the National Press Club November 9, 1995

AMBASSADOR RABINOVICH: Thank you very much for this kind introduction, for the genuine sentiments that you have expressed.

And I would like to begin by taking this opportunity to offer my gratitude, the gratitude of the people of Israel, the government and the state of Israel, to the American people, to the American government, for your display of friendship, support, confidence at a very difficult time in our history. The outpour of sympathy, support and solidarity from this country, from the first moments after the terrible news of the assassination arrived here, culminating in the participation of what I believe was an unprecedented delegation from the United States in the funeral services and in the other events of this last Monday in Israel; in the -- in other manifestations of these sentiments, as expressed in the participation in several memorial services that were held here in Washington and in other American cities; the long lines of Americans from the high and mighty to simple folk who came to sign the condolence book in our embassy; what the media said and wrote about Mr. Rabin and about the event and about us -- this all combines to endow the term "special relationship" that has been used countless times to characterize the relationship between the United States and Israel, to endow it with a very meaning and substance.

And we are all genuinely grateful for all of this, and we feel enhanced and reinforced at this very difficult and delicate time in our own evolution as a state and as a society.

I do not want to take much time in a statement, and I would rather spend more time responding to your questions. It's difficult for me personally to grapple with the topic of Israel after the assassination of Rabin. I had the privilege of working very closely with the prime minister for over three years now, in my role as ambassador to the United States, a relationship that to him was Israel's most strategic relationship.

And in the conduct of the negotiations with Syria, which began an important dimension of the Arab-Israeli peace process I spent many hours with him and developed a very personal bond with him and I thought working with him was a privilege and difficult for me personally to think it terms of after Rabin, as the sign outside of the door said.

Also, this is a time at which things are still gelling. We are very few days after the assassination. Not all the effects concerning the assassination have been uncovered yet. And you must have read or seen today that additional suspects were arrested by the police for either direct or indirect implication or suspicion of implication in the assassination. And then the investigation is still unfolding in full gear. We do not know what the findings of the investigation will be.

Beginning with this, we are groping with the need to consolidate and to go through a transition. I think the country and the government and the political system have all displayed an impressive degree of resilience and coherence. I think that the position taken by the principal opposition party, the Likud, a position indicating that Likud will vote for Mr. Peres as prime minister when Mr. Peres forms his government, is a very mature and a very edifying step. It means the main opposition party felt correctly that this was not the time for a small political accounting, it was a time in which a country, a political system (was) called upon to display resilience and solidarity and a basic unity of the people, divided as we may be over very important political questions. And this, of course, facilitates the transition. And yet a government needs to be formed, and the question of a possibility of expanding the government coalition is a very relevant question. And this needs to happen. And, of course, before there is a government, policies cannot be made. Thoughts can be entertained about policies, but the time to determine policies and to start implementing them will come when the new government is in place.

But some basic tenets of the situation and of the policies of the government, be it as an interim government or as the permanent government that will be formed I believe in short order by Mr. Peres, had to be stated.

First and foremost is, of course, the determination to respect, live up to all commitments made by the government as a government and by Mr. Rabin personally to continue in the peace process. More specifically, in the Palestinian track of the peace process, there are no negotiations scheduled right now. The next phase of negotiation is not to begin before May 1996, when the permanent status negotiations are scheduled to begin. What needs to happen now is the beginning of redeployment of the IDF, the holding of Palestinian elections, and the implementation of the agreement that was signed so very recently in Washington, and this, of course, is continuing and will continue.

There is the question of negotiations with Syria. As you know, as you probably know, the negotiation between Israel and Syria has been suspended for several months now. It was not suspended by us; it was suspended by Syrian action last July. And during the past few weeks, efforts were afoot by the U.S. administration -- by the Clinton administration, by the State Department -- to try to resuscitate the talks between Israel and Syria. And some of the last decisions made by Prime Minister Rabin concerned that. And he met with President Clinton, with Secretary Christopher and with the U.S. peace team headed by Ambassador Dennis Ross, and the parameters were established for the efforts to be continued by the U.S. peace team in what then would have been described as the next few weeks, with a view to reviewing the Syrian-Israeli negotiations.

These efforts will continue. They will continue fully when we have a government in place, but Acting Prime Minister Peres has indicated that he certainly wants to continue in this vein. But the basic question that had been with us for months remains with us: Do we have a partner for these negotiations, a partner not only in the sense of wanting to conclude an agreement with Israel, but making the decisions that will make such an agreement possible? There was a question mark that hovered over these negotiations, at least from our point of view, for the past few months, and it's still hovering.

This question mark will have to be addressed in the next few weeks, so we are determined to proceed, but we need first to have definitive answers to the one big question mark, or to several question marks, that we have in this regard. Another issue that I would like to address, briefly, concerns the soul- searching that is taking place in Israel now. A democracy in the midst of making difficult and controversial decisions is a democracy that undergoes difficult tests. A government that has a small parliamentary majority and makes decisions on crucial national issues is going through a difficult period. And there was inflammatory rhetoric, and the foul odor of political violence had been in the air for some time.

It would be very easy for us as a government, and for the supporters of this government, to become vindictive and partisan at this time. This is not the intention. One wants to explore the crime fully. One wants to understand the context in which it took place. And one wants the soul-searching that has begun in Israel, to continue to unfold.

But one also wants to heal. One does not want to slide from responsible soul- searching that is done by everybody in a constructive and a responsible fashion, into partisan bickering. There is a very fine line that separates one from the other. And we are determined to do that. Questions -- important questions need to be addressed that do not have to be partisan.

Let us take the assassination itself. Among other things, Prime Minister Rabin was killed because he mingled with the crowd. A decision could have been made a long time ago that, in this -- in the political atmosphere that I described earlier, the prime minister and the foreign minister, and other leaders of the country that have been identified with the peace process and with these decisions that were not acceptable to some, should be kept away -- at arm's length -- from crowds.

Then, the imperative that a leader in a democratic society feels is the need to interact with the crowd, with the people; not to be insulated; and, as always, a trade-off and a balance that needs to be made. And I think Americans are particularly aware of this. And, you know, Pennsylvania Avenue was closed down in this city not a long time ago. And other decisions have been made, and other decisions have not been made in this country that concern this very question of the personal, physical relationship between the head of the government and the constituency.

But these are questions that need not be partisan and need to be asked in a democracy -- questions of freedom of speech. I said earlier "inflammatory rhetoric." When is rhetoric just inflammatory, or when are the boundaries of the law being crossed by someone who uses inflammatory rhetoric? Who is to guarantee to us that the laws that this week would be there to curb inflammatory rhetoric and maybe to prevent another assassination would not be used in order to affect, curb genuine freedom of expression at another point? Again, a question familiar to all democracies and very familiar to you in this country.

So some of these issues are the issues that Israeli society is grappling with now. They are not new to us, but they are more poignant now than they have been in the past, and Israeli society does it in (informal ?) meetings, in formal gatherings, and, first and foremost, over the media. These are the themes that dominate the airwaves and the printed media in Israel now.

This is where I'd like to end my statement. And of course, I would welcome any questions and will try to answer them as fully and as openly as I can under these unusual circumstances.

MR. HICKMAN: Thank you, Ambassador Rabinovich. Please state your name and your affiliation when you're asking questions. (Over there ?). Yeah, Ahmed (sp)?

Q (Yes, sir ?). Ahmed Said (sp), Egyptian correspondent. Now we know these groups in Israel who assassinated, one way or another, Prime Minister Rabin, but do you think some militant Islamic groups, by their inflammatory rhetoric and their terrorist activities, too, in the last few days helped these groups in Israel to find their way to make more actions, more rhetoric through this kind of combinations, like -- helped them at the same time? I would like to (hear your opinion ?). Thank you.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yeah. Thank you for the question. Let me -- has anybody heard the question in the back, or need I --

MR. HICKMAN: Yeah, why don't you repeat it -- (inaudible).

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yeah. The question was on -- Mr. Said says that since now that we know the identity of the groups responsible for the assassination in Israel, what about the rhetoric that came from militant Islamic groups during the past few days and which justified the assassination and added more oil to the fire? How does one affect the other?

First, let me say we have to be very careful with our terminology. We do not know the identity of any group that was responsible for the assassination.

We know we have an assassin who confessed to the crime. We know that he had affiliations. Suspects were picked up that were affiliated with him. But what their relationship to the assassination itself, and whether it is warranted at this time to speak about a group responsible for the assassination or whether it still can be seen as the act of a lone assassin is premature to say. So I would like us to be very precise in that.

Now, we have heard some of this rhetoric that came from militant Muslim groups that welcomed the assassination. We know that Mr. Rabin had been attacked personally, and his government has been attacked in political terms by some of these groups. When the last car-bombing of a bus in Israel took place, a statement was released that took responsibility for the act and explained that this act was directed at the Rabin government in order to topple the Rabin government because the Rabin government has been an enemy of Islam, and so forth and so forth. But more specifically, of course, Iran because the prime minister spoke often and effectively about Iran and the message of extremist, fundamentalist exploitation of religion for political purposes as the main danger to Israel as such, and to the Middle East. And certainly there was an attempt to target him politically.

And part of the problem with the protection of the prime minister was that -- I think if the Israel Security Service had the notion of an attempt on the prime minister's life, it was first and foremost an attempt that would come from a group of that nature -- a terrorist foreign group, maybe a militant group inspired by Iran. That specifically was on their mind and they were better prepared for this than for a Jewish Israeli assassin.

Now it is -- it's a very sad commentary that the assassination -- the tragic assassination of a great leader, that the whole world would mourn, would be welcome in such fashion by two or three states and a group of movements. It's deplorable and I think it reflects very negatively on these groups themselves. Of course it can be and probably will be viewed by people who criticize the peace process in Israel who would point to these groups and say, well, these are not the people that you want to make peace with. Our answer is that we're not making -- or we would not be making peace with these groups, we'd be making peace with the states and peoples of the region; that these people oppose the peace process precisely because they know that peace is not good for them. And the way to proceed is peacemaking, even if a chorus of ugly rhetoric can be heard in the background.

MODERATOR: Next question. Did you have your hand up, Jeff?

Q Yes.

MODERATOR: Okay, and then Reuters.

Q Mr. Ambassador, I'm Jeffrey -- (last name inaudible). I'm the editor of Focus Israel and -- (inaudible) -- Newsletters. In the past, there's been some concern about fund-raising in the United States going towards extremist Arab groups in the Middle East, including Israel. Does your government have any concern about fund- raising in the United States which goes towards Jewish groups in Israel?

AMB. RABINOVICH: This is not an issue that we as a government dealt with, and I must say that the issue that you have just raised as such has not been on our screen.

MODERATOR: Yes? And then -- (inaudible).

Q My name is -- (inaudible). I'm from Reuters. I just have a -- (inaudible) -- question on possibly restarting the peace process with Syria. Can we still say that you're looking to trying to resume talks or resume this contact within the next few weeks? Are you that -- (inaudible)?

AMB. RABINOVICH: We -- you know, we always wanted to have contact with Syria. We always believed and said that the best way, the only way to negotiate effectively and to conclude agreements would be by direct contact. We had direct contact with the Syrians in delegation form when we used to meet in delegations. That was direct, but it was very stilted and difficult to negotiate in those formal, stilted negotiations. And then we had here a direct contact, but never exclusively with Syria. The Syrians insisted that the meetings be attended by at least one American representative, never exclusive Israeli-Syrian contacts, and again under very structured circumstances as dictated by Syria.

So we have always felt and said that one of the impediments to progress, or further progress in these negotiations was the mode of negotiation that basically was dictated by Syria.

Now, contact was suspended in July when sequence agreed upon by the parties was broken by Syria, and we have said all along that we would like to renew contact once the impediments or the obstacles placed by Syria were to be removed, and this remains our position.

And we will not be the ones who say that we do not want to meet with the Syrians. But at the same time we must insist that agreements be kept and honored. If agreements on procedure are not kept, what's the point of making other agreements? So, there is -- in that respect there is no obstacle or objection on our part. We want to -- of course, always want to resume contact but contact needs to be resumed in a way that also respects the agreements made between us.

Q Can I just have a brief follow-up? Last week, just one day before the assassination, Israel's economic minister said that he talked to people in the State Department, that they were encouraged enough by Syria's readiness to continue the talks that they were sending Dennis Ross over. The State Department -- (inaudible)?

AMB. RABINOVICH: There was the discussion and the probability of Ambassador Ross coming out to the region to deal with that. I very much hope that we will see Ambassador Ross back in the region in the not-too-distant future, not necessarily to do this. There's an entirely new situation, of course, in Israel, in the Middle East, and there may be many good reasons for Ambassador Ross or any other senior American diplomats to be in the region. Of course, there was a massive American presence, but a funeral is not the right occasion for the conduct of business. And I will not be surprised if other opportunities will be sought when the mourning period is after.

MR. HICKMAN: (Name inaudible) -- and then -- (inaudible) -- over here.

Q I was wondering if you can explain a little bit about how --

MR. HICKMAN: Would you identify yourself?

Q Sure. (Name inaudible) -- of the Jerusalem Times. Have you determined through the Americans, through other channels, how the Syrians see the new government, the new temporary government (handled ?) by Peres, as affecting their willingness to deal? I mean, is it going to throw an additional monkey wrench into the equation that was already there -- (inaudible) -- the talks? And also, how much does it trouble the government not to have had any (message ?) concerning -- (word inaudible) -- assassinations?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Can you repeat the last part of the question?

Q (Inaudible.)

AMB. RABINOVICH: Right. You know, it's still impossible to speculate on the policy of the new government when there is -- there still isn't a new government. And in that respect, I think it is premature. I think that the Syrians are aware of our determination to continue with the same policies and the government's determination to respect all commitments.

And the question really returns to the very same point, not so much a Syrian perception of the new Israeli government, but the Syrian decisions that need to be taken.

With regard to the failure to offer any act of condolence, if you remember, I was asked about that over the weekend in some of the first press interviews that I gave after the assassination. I expressed very much the hope to have that, and I said that -- I apologize for quoting myself, but it still remains the relevant answer. I said then the element of warmth and the human touch was very glaringly absent from these negotiations, that I very much hoped that this time we would see that, and I said that I would be positively surprised if it happened. And I wasn't positively surprised.

I don't think -- to answer your -- the last portion of the question directly, we had no expectations, we were not disappointed, and yet I am disappointed.

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible.) Is the fact the Syria has not offered a public apology to Israel seen as an impediment to resuming the Israeli-Syrian negotiations?

AMB. RABINOVITCH: No. I just expressed disappointment because as I said, I think that the absence of any human touch or warmth in these negotiations or in the position projected to us from Damascus doesn't help the negotiations. But these negotiations and peace negotiations in general are not based on sentiment and emotion, but are based on other elements. It's a political decision. We have made the decision that we want to explore the possibility of making with Syria -- making peace with Syria or arriving at an agreement that would meet our criteria for peace and security. We seem determined to -- to try to explore whether this is possible and to turn it into an agreement if it turns out that it is possible. And regrettable as the absence of any act of condolence or personal or human touch that I mentioned before is absent, but in itself is not an impediment to the resumption of negotiations.

Q (Off mike) -- (inaudible) -- Mr. Ambassador, there's an aspect of the Syrian-Israeli peace talks that concerns -- (inaudible) -- and that indicates the existence of terrorists camps in the Syrian- controlled Bekaa Valley. Now, I know issues like Golan Heights, for example, are extremely important, in terms of those discussions.

I was wondering if a peace is possible between Israel and Syria, without addressing that crucial issue? What will happen to these terrorist camps? Or is it not too important an issue for you at this point in time?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Right. Thank you for the question.

I use the term "our criteria for peace and security" earlier. Now, the Bekaa Valley is in Lebanon. And Lebanon is a sovereign country, but Syria enjoys a great deal of influence in Lebanon.

I cannot envisage -- I cannot envisage a peace made between Israel and Syria without provisions and agreements, between Israel and between Lebanon, that will make certain that there will not be any terrorist camps in the Bekaa Valley, or in any other part. This will not meet our criteria either of peace or of security.

Now, the negotiations unfortunately are not at the point where this discussion is on the agenda. But if the negotiations move forward and we get to that point, this of course would be a very important issue for us, as well.

MR. HICKMAN: Joe, and then Carl (sp).

Q Mr. Ambassador, after the tragedy of last Saturday --

MR. HICKMAN: Could you identify yourself, Joe?

Q Oh, Joseph Polakoff, Washington correspondent, Jewish Newspapers. Mr. Ambassador, after the tragedy of last Saturday, the Jewish organizations of the United States have been critical of the negotiating policy of the Israeli government, and have issued statements and held meetings deploring the tragedy, and hoping that unity and civil discourse, and in a democratic fashion, will prevail in Israel.

As you mentioned today that Prime Minister Peres has mentioned, after Netanyahu had said that the Likud Party will not dispute the rights of the Prime Ministry. In fact, Netanyahu used the same words you did -- (inaudible) -- of the politicians.

But -- and yet, afterwards, Netanyahu was personally attacked in words by rather prominent people, and I wonder whether the government of Israel would consider personal attacks on Netanyahu, who is leader of the opposition, the disparaging effort on the part of people who would say there should be unity with -- (inaudible).

Second question is about Arafat and his failure to appear at the funeral and the statement made by the -- (inaudible) -- spokesman of the Israeli government that they did not want him there and does that affect your relationship between Peres and Arafat and when will those negotiations as you see it now be resumed? Will Arafat move a little more quickly than -- (inaudible) -- from the top with his people -- (inaudible).

AMB. RABINOVICH: With regard to your first question or statement, as it really was, let us remember one thing the Likud party said that it will support the formation of the permanent government of Mr. Peres but there is an election in Israel planned or scheduled for October 1996. So the political disagreement or dispute and the normal contest and political struggle between the parties and the camps continues. This is not the end of parties and politics in Israel. And I don't think Mr. Netanyahu needs the political protection of the government and I think the process of soul searching, introspection and political discourse in Israel is conducted in a very dignified, dignified way. I don't think government needs to take any additional action in this regard.

With regard to Mr. Arafat: I think that -- of course, having been in Israel and at the funeral ceremony, Palestinian participation in the ceremony struck precisely the right note -- (inaudible) -- I think that we all realize -- we all in this case means both Israelis and Palestinians -- that we have not concluded still the final agreement that puts an end to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.

We have a framework agreement that drew a framework for concluding an agreement and we have moved happily or fortunately from armed conflict and political conflict to political competition. But we have set a time frame of five years for the implementation of this agreement and for the discussion of permanent status issues, because we know that there are still many wounds that need to healed and that there is a process of reconciliation that is only in an early stage.

And perhaps for Mr. Arafat to appear in this funeral would have been too early, and I think that this was sensed both by Palestinians and by Israelis. And yet, Mr. Sharif (ph) and Mr. Abu Alaa, and other prominent Palestinians who work with Mr. Arafat and participated in the negotiations with us, came to the funeral. And I think everybody felt that this was the right level of representation and that this was the right tone to be struck, and there is no problem with that.

Now, with regard to the negotiations, as I said at my opening statement, there's no need to negotiate now before May 1996 when the negotiations for final status are to begin. We are now at the phase of implementation, and implementation does proceed.

MR. HICKMAN: Carl?

Q Carl Hartman, Associated Press. You spoke of the need for Syria to respect its agreements with regard to the negotiation. Could you explain what those commitments are and to what extent they've not been fulfilled?

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes. Last June, Secretary of State Christopher came to the Middle East and shuttled between Jerusalem and Damascus. His visit took place in the aftermath of the conclusion of a non-paper on the principles of security arrangements. And on the basis of that, he arranged for a three- phase sequence: the first phase, meeting between the chiefs of staff of the two armies; the second, a trip to the Middle East by the U.S. peace team in the aftermath of these negotiations; and the third, for another group of military experts to come to Washington to flesh-out the points of convergence or agreement that will have been reached, or would have been reached in the discussions between the chiefs of staff.

And the first phase took place and, according to our feeling -- our, Israeli and I believe American as well -- was actually a good meeting.

In the aftermath of that meeting, although there were points of disagreement, most prominently the question of ground station for early warning that we regard as essential as part of our security arrangements, in the aftermath of that, Ambassador Dennis Ross headed the American team that came out to the Middle East. The group was told by President Assad that he was not happy with the first round, that he thought that the issue of early warning and ground station needed to be resolved before the experts came to Washington, and he was not about to send his experts to Washington.

Our position -- and again, I do not want to speak for the administration, the administration will speak for itself, but certainly our position was that when Secretary Christopher worked out the procedure, there was no conditionality in the transition from one phase to the next, and we insisted that the procedure be kept.

Now, we do not want to be sticklers for detail, for protocol. At the same time, we felt when Prime Minister Rabin was leading the negotiations, and I think we continue to believe so under the aegis of Prime Minister Peres, that it is not the procedure but it is the principle of living up to commitments that is here at stake. At the same time, I do not want to focus the whole issue over the question of venue and procedure. There are much larger questions.

Now, there is a limited time frame to these negotiations. At some point in 1996, the negotiations will have to be folded or, hopefully, positively concluded. We were very crudely reminded by the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin that you cannot take anything for granted, and that what is available at a certain time ought to be taken advantage of or may not be there the next week or the next month or the next year. And these are larger questions than the question of procedure; and I think, I very much hope, that when all those who are concerned with these negotiations -- we, the Syrians, and our American friends -- take a look at this question, of course we will, I know for our part, the Israelis, we'll take a look at the larger question, will not just focus on the detail of who promised what to whom, although, as I mentioned earlier, for us it's very important that commitments be honored and kept. But we will also bear the larger picture in mind, and it is mostly the big answers to the big questions that need to be addressed in the next few weeks.

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible.) Mr. Ambassador, the foreign -- minister of Foreign Affairs, Farouk al-Shara, said that he hopes for a speedy (comeback ?) to the (negotiation ?) table.

And we heard that Minister Yossi Beilin in Israel (finds ?) that a shocking statement, because how can the Syrian foreign minister find something positive as we come out of this tragedy? Do you think that this statement by (Farouk al-Shara ?) has some positive element, (like ?) the Syrian intentions to speed up the process, or do you see it as a shocking (sort of ?) statement by Syria?

AMB. RABINOVICH: I believe that the comment by Minister Beilin referred to the formulation used by the Syria statement: that something "good," quote, unquote, may come out of something evil. And I think that his comment or criticism referred to that, not so much to the substance of the comment.

On the substance, the question is not so much the statement of intention, but its translation into actual decision or decisions on the questions. I think that we and the Syrians -- "we" is this Israeli government -- and the Syrians have negotiated for over three years. Not too many mysteries with regard to each other's position between us. We know exactly what the major issues are, what the concerns of the other side is. We have felt that if Syria were to take a number of decisions on some of these issues, then negotiations could have moved expeditiously and therefore could have moved expeditiously -- that --that's talking about the past.

In the present situation, this statement needs to be translated into actual decisions. And when we will be in a position to observe these decisions, I think we'll be better poised and better equipped to assess what they actually mean for the pace and direction of the negotiations. It's too early now.

MR. HICKMAN: We have time for one more question. (Inaudible name)?

Q (Ahmed Said ?). Just a few hours ago, the attorney general, Ms. Janet Reno, said that the FBI has offered its assistance to Israeli officials in their investigation into the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and (that the ?) FBI immediately responded to Israeli authorities to offer their -- (inaudible) -- assistance and their full cooperation. How you can characterize this cooperation? And are you happy with this cooperation? Thank you.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Yes, I think that our two justice systems and our two law enforcement systems have had -- "ours" means American and Israeli -- have had excellent relations over the years, including in the recent past and in the present. And we are very pleased with this cooperation, and I am sure that we will have reason to continue to be very pleased with it.

Q Thank you.

AMB. RABINOVICH: Thank you.

MR. HICKMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.