Introduction

Perhaps to set just a little bit the historical context. This year it's 20 years, more or less, since the Camp David Accords. It's also five years since Oslo. I wasn't involved in Oslo, but I have been involved in attempts to make peace with our Arab neighbors since Camp David, Madrid, after Madrid, and now, in the present process. What we of course all ask ourselves, should ask ourselves, 20 years since Camp David, 5 years since Oslo, is what will the next 20 years, the next 5 years bring, and not just to the Middle East but to the world as a whole.

When I left here five years ago, a bit more, there was talk about a new world order, if you remember, and Mr. Fukiyama spoke about an end to history. What we see in effect is probably a new, or not-so-new, world disorder. We see a world in serious economic and political disarray, imbalance, lack of stability, perhaps with worse to come. And if I may be permitted a digression, I would say, all this makes it more important than ever before that the United States of America is and will remain a very strong power. That's in the interest of world peace.

The Middle East and the World

Coming back to the issue at hand, I think it was the present French foreign minister who said not long ago that, although we don't pay too much attention to them, right now there are about 25 wars or armed conflicts going on right now around the world, talking about new world order. And those in the context of our region, the Middle East, out of the 26 or so armed conflicts, wars, since WWII, only five had anything to do with Israel or the Israeli Arab conflict, Palestinian conflict. I'm stressing this point in order to make it very clear that it is unfortunately shear nonsense to assume that if only the Palestinian problem would somehow go away, that all will be peace and quiet in our part of the world. The Middle East will unfortunately continue to be a rather dangerous neighborhood for a long time to come, perhaps more dangerous than it was. There are rogue states in the area, Iran, Iraq. There is advanced missile technology flowing into these countries, Syria as well. There is the growing threat of all sorts of unconventional weapons.

There is something that I call the new appearance really, or new phenomenon, of no state states. I mean, states which are there, sometimes members of the United Nations, but which don't have real governance. They are states which sometimes encourage, sometimes tolerate, sometimes harbor, terrorist organizations, and I think the world is still looking for the best way, the most effective way, to cope with that situation. And talking about the missile threat, it's also interesting to remember that there are really only two states in the world today, the US and Israel, which are trying to cope practically and effectively with this growing threat, not just to Israel, not just to the neighboring countries in the Middle East, but with the advance in missile technology perhaps to every part of the world, including the United States of America.

Peace Process - Background

Returning now to the conference which we are starting tomorrow afternoon, first here in Washington then at the Wye Plantation. As you know, the government of Israel has endorsed the policy of the Prime Minister and I would perhaps turn it and say it was a policy of peace and security, peace with security, and that's not just a slogan.

Briefly about the historical perspective, you may remember the Israeli-Palestinian talks were stalled for about 18 months. The pretext was the Har Homa project in southern Jerusalem. The real reason, however, was that the Palestinians, and not just them, were unable to recognize that there was a new government in Israel, a new reality, that was supported by the majority of the people in Israel. And the new reality was that while the new Israeli government was committed to the Oslo process and the Oslo agreements, although, we had not been a party to formulating these agreements but we were committed to them and are committed to them. We were not committed to unrealistic Palestinian expectations of what might or would come out of Oslo, nor would the Israeli Government subscribe to a policy of continuing violence, condoning violence, a situation of continuing violence and what looked to us as practically a zero effort to combat terrorism on the Palestinian side and to pretend as if nothing had happened. The Arab side also didn't sufficiently appreciate the fact that they would have to deal with the democratically elected government of Israel, and because they hoped perhaps for its downfall, for some changes, anyway, they did not seriously try to engage us. From their point of view it was probably much more preferable to create an atmosphere of stalling, of crisis perhaps, in order to bring about international pressure, especially American pressure on Israel, and so many more months were wasted.

Our American friends tried to breath, I would say, new life, into the process and announced what was known, I think in January, as the American initiative. The long and the short of it was that after the Palestinian Israeli talks were resumed about three and a half months ago, we believed, that agreements could be reached, perhaps rather swiftly, and that the gaps were significantly narrowed in these bilateral talks, with American involvement. But every time there seemed to be progress, the following day there seemed to be back-tracking on the part of the Palestinians. I don't want to enlarge on possible explanations for that. The explanations could be practical, they could be in perceptions, they could be perhaps internal Palestinian politics, but the fact is that in spite of the efforts of Prime Minister Netanyahu and of our American friends to achieve progress, it wasn't until the US began once again to be very active in its involvement that a breakthrough was in site.

The Importance of Security

The conference in the Wye Plantation is basically about making previous Palestinian commitments stick, or, to make the Palestinians stick to their commitments to Rabin, within the framework of the Oslo agreements, within the framework of the Hebron Agreement. I would say there are certain aspects to these commitments, some are more important, some are less important. Yet most important from our point of view, and I believe it is a concern shared by the Administration and the Congress of this country, is with regards to security. That is the most important aspect and will make or break the conference which is going to start tomorrow. And we are talking not just about a document, but a plan, a work plan, which the American side is helping, has helped, will be helping, to formulate, which is fine from our point of view, but which has not yet been achieved, so that is still open. And without a security document of that sort, I'm not sure whether the American initiative, will come or can come to a successful conclusion. I mean, these are the two pillars, and I'm quoting an American personality involved with the peace process.

These are the two main pillars of this process: the security arrangements on the one hand, and the Israel's further redeployment or the Israeli withdrawl, from an additional 10+3%, 13% of the territories. Two pillars. It won't work if only one pillar exists, because if the other pillar isn't there, the first one won't be there, either. The importance of this conference could have been, should have been, and hopefully will and can be, about leading us on a fast track towards permanent status negotiation. And this has been our view all along, even before the Israeli elections. Let's get to permanent status, which, basically means, how Israelis and Palestinians are going to coexist in that very small country which both of us share for all time, whether we like it or not. We'll be there, Palestinians will be there, and we will have to find a modus operandi. That's what permanent status basically means.

Our View of Permanent Status and Continuing the Process

Naturally the character, the nature, the exact configuration of permanent status can only be written by the sides themselves. Nor can the solution be preempted by unilateral acts such as violating existing agreements, basically the Oslo Agreement, by declaring an independent Palestinian state unilaterally. It would not only be illegal, but also very foolish and counter productive from the Palestinian point of view to declare a state, without an agreement, with its Israeli neighbor. Not only would it probably put an end to the peace process, but it would have very serious consequences for the whole future of the area and for the Palestinians themselves.

But what we hope will come out of this conference, is that the two sides will immediately resume, I would say actually start, but let's call it resume, permanent status negotiations. It doesn't seem very probably, even though I'm an optimist, that permanent status negotiations can be finished by May 1999, which is the date which was foreseen by Oslo. But the intention never was, by those who made Oslo, that if permanent status agreement had not been reached by then everything which had been achieved before that was, as it were, null and void. The agreements of course still hold. May 1999 may be a goal, but it's not realistic to believe this goal can actually be achieved by then, in the very short time which remains.

So one of the main objectives of this conference, I think, should be to find a formula for continuation. To continue beyond those agreements which will be reached in between and hopefully be reached in the next few days, if they will be reached, and to continue the permanent status negotiations without necessarily having a stop watch in our hands. Let's not forget that the most serious and critical and difficult problems are still out there. It's not the 13%. Jerusalem and borders and settlements and so-called right of return, these are all things which will have to be deliberated in permanent status negotiations. I mean, these are not easy things.

Peace Ideology

We in Israel, I believe, have a vision of peace, of economic prosperity, for all the peoples in the region. We see this as a name, peace. I'm sorry to say we don't always feel that this vision is shared by all our neighbors. I think it was Jonathan Swift who said that a vision is seeing something invisible. We would like to make that vision visible for everyone to enjoy, for everyone to benefit. And from that point of view, there's a certain asymmetry between our approach and that of our neighbors. I'm mentioning this in a historical context. We in Israel, and I think, we in the West in general, believe following Emanual Kant, and others, that trade between people, commerce, friendly relations, will pave the way for political solutions, will pave the way to the elimination of wars.

In parts of the Arab world, it's the other way around. First political solutions, then we'll speak about normalization, then we'll speak about expanding trade, which I think is hurtful. Not just for the sake of peace, but certainly for the mood in the Arab countries, who expected peace dividends which they haven't received. And that's a tragedy.

That's also a difference if we look at it. I think Professor Shimon Shamir, who many of you may know, made the distinction between what he called pragmatic peace and ideological peace. Namely, there are many in the Arab world who accept peace with Israel as a pragmatic proposition because Israel is strong, Israel has won all its wars, because Israel is proported to have nuclear weapons, because Israel has an alliance with the United States. But it's not yet ideological peace, namely, yes, we, the Arab Muslim world, recognize and accept the Jewish people's right to their homeland in this part of the world. And from that point of view we still have a long way to go.

But the hope is that pragmatic peace, as we've seen in Europe from time to time, over time, perhaps in a generation or so can become ideological. People will get used to the idea that the State of Israel is a permanent fixture in that part of the world, and that will pave the way towards a much securer peace perhaps, than the present pragmatic peace as it is.

What We Expect from the Summit

Now, let's talk about the arrangements which are being proposed now. Try to imagine a balance sheet. You have two columns, one the Israeli commitments and the other the Palestinian commitments. This sheet covers a period of three months, twelve weeks, and it's subdivided into different stages, into two weeks, let's say. That's not the most important point. And at each stage, something has to happen. The Palestinians have to live up to certain commitments with regards to security, not just promises. There have been plenty of promises. Afterwards, we withdraw from such and such a proportion out of the 13%. Then there's another stage and they do this and that which I'll enumerate and we will withdraw even more. So at the end, at the bottom line of that balance sheet, everything will have been accomplished. Palestinian commitments on the one hand, Israeli commitments on the other hand. I know that in a real balance sheet when it doesn't balance, one puts in an item called good will. I'm not sure we can do this in this respect. We're talking about very concrete things. I'll just enumerate them not necessarily in order of importance although, they may be by order of importance.

I mentioned already the working paper on security. Which means renewing effective security cooperation between the Palestinians and Israel with an American involvement. That means catching and punishing terrorists. That means combating terror, not just verbally, not just putting someone in prison and letting them out after a few days and weeks or even a few months. But to destroy the Hamas and other organization's infrastructure, the infrastructure. I mean, you can arrest a terrorist but as long as the infrastructure remains, where they manufacture bombs, where they manufacture explosives, perhaps chemical implements, the financing, the training, the infrastructure has to be destroyed.

In addition to that there is a question of handing over illegal arms. There are illegal arms in the territories, beyond what has been agreed in the Oslo Agreements. There is the Palestinian police force, which according to Oslo should count I believe 24,000 policeman, now it's almost 40,000. That means it's really a mini-army. It has to get back to what has been agreed upon.

Then there's the matter of incitement. We are talking about a trilateral committee, Palestinians, Israel, and Americans, to stop the incitement which goes on, it has been going on all the time, especially in Palestinian schools and Palestinian youth camps, in the Palestinian media, which is partly at least controlled by the Palestinian Authority, the sort of incitement which calls for Jihad, holy war, to destroy the State of Israel, this is not an empty thing. If you educate children that once they grow up, their destiny is to destroy their neighbor, we believe this is a very important point.

Last but not least, we want to see the Palestinian National Covenant or Charter finally abolished, or abolishing at least those clauses, articles in it which call for the destruction of Israel, and I'll let you in in a secret. Out of a total of 33 articles in that document, 29 call for the destruction of the State of Israel in one way or another. So, it doesn't make much difference in the whole covenant is abolished, or just those articles in the Covenant. Again, one may say, it's just a piece of paper. But it's symbolic. It is symbolically important in order to change pragmatic peace into ideological peace that hateful document should go away.

There has been progress on the security related issues, but at this moment it is not yet finalized. We can only hope that it will be finalized at Wye Plantation. And of course, in the minds of Israelis, this has been exacerbated with the murder which took place yesterday in Jerusalem of an innocent civilian bathing in a stream. His friend was also seriously wounded, hopefully he will survive. And the murderer, a Hamas person, escaped into the Palestinian Authority.

You may see this as an isolated incident, but it is not isolated. That is just underscoring how serious our concern really is.

I mentioned this matter of incitement, there has been a lot of progress on that. I believe there is hope we can finalize that. The rest of the Palestinian obligations are still far from settled, but could be settled. One thing, of course, has been finalized, and that is Israel's agreeing to a withdrawl of 13%, which I mentioned before, mainly giving up 13 additional percent of the land. But, as I said, and I'll repeat this now, without the Palestinian quid there won't be Israeli quo. It's not an agreement about withdrawl. It's an agreement about security on the one hand and withdrawl on the other hand. So these two things are inseparably linked to each other. And I believe that that's the American position as well.

Our Desire for Peace

I want to repeat what the Prime Minister has said. He may have to pay a very high political price for achieving an agreement, even agreeing to have this agreement, and he is willing to do that. But he will not pay for an agreement by compromising the security of the Israeli people. Without the security document in place we can't really see an agreement. And it doesn't make, practically, much different if Chairman Arafat can't, or won't, control the Hamas. The outcome will be the same. By the way, as I said, also, probably to him. And there's absolute proof of the upgraded terrorist designs by the Hamas. We have recently discovered various documents, various plans in that respect, and I can tell you it's frightening.