Mr. Chairman, Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It's only seven months since my last appearance here but there is one great difference: not so much in my views actually, I hold on to most of the views I expressed then. Nor really with regard to most of the issues they are still with us. But, there is one great difference in December I said in my opening statement: "Not holding at present I stressed the "At present" any official position, I am expressing my own views only". For some odd reason I can no longer say thisÉ

And another thing, had I not known that Rob Satloff was a friend, I obviously would have suspected him that, when he called me in Israel and suggested this date, Monday the 27th he knew what sort of date this might be for the peace process and that he wanted to get me into hot waterÉNot really, Rob but as you will all readily understand some things I might have said, I won't say and besides, anything I will say may be old hat by the time this lunch is over. The good news right now is that Israel's Defense Minister Mordechai and the PLO's Abu-Mazen have been meeting the day before yesterday and that their teams will continue today from the point where the Palestinians broke off the talks last week. Israel has put some concrete proposals on the table I hope they will bring about a successful conclusion. (Prime Minister will bring to the Knesset in spite of recess)

Nevertheless, in spite of what I said before, and at my own risk, I am going to quote myself at least on some matters. Last December I said the following:

"The main focus of attention these last few weeks has been on the matter of the further redeployments, or more specifically the second redeployment. But the very fact that so much energy is being expended on what is, after all, a side-issue and not just that, but a side issue which has all the potential of making it more difficult to reach any sort of solution on the main issue, namely "permanent status" negotiations shows that everybody involved in this debate, not least the United States, is still not sufficiently focused on the really important things."

And I added:

"I personally am not very happy that we got into a situation where the whole matter of the second redeployment has become such a major bone of contention, especially between us and America and maybe this could have been avoided but having said that, what our decision says in essence is the following: We shall withdraw from such and such areas on a date to be determined provided the Palestinians fulfill till then their commitments under the Hebron Agreement, which they haven't done so far. That the redeployment will be in tune with the Government's plan for the permanent settlement is only elementary logic and I can only repeat that had everybody agreed to proceed forthwith to the "permanent-status" negotiations a lot of unnecessary trouble and acrimony could perhaps have been avoided."

I then continued

"I thought at the time, and I haven't changed my opinion, that Oslo was a mistake. Oslo gave rise to a lot of unrealistic and unrealizable expectations, so that wide-ranging discontent with its results was bound to follow. One major fault was probably that of the illusion of a supposedly new Middle East, but I won't go into that now. Some of the thoughts behind Oslo agreements make for interesting study-material. It wasn't only the unsatisfactory way security matters were dealt with but the idea of handing over a major part of the "territories" without having addressed many of the really tough issues, without peace agreement, before "permanent status" talks had started will look to future historians as hard to explain.

There can be little doubt that the Israeli leadership of the day probably reasoned that it, the Israeli leadership, required an interim period in order to convince the Israelis that the PLO had indeed finally recognized Israel's right to exist, that the threat of terrorism and violence was over once and for all, that the Palestinians had been able to establish a political society with at least a semblance of democracy in short that by the time we get to the difficult and problematical concessions in the permanent status Israelis would be convinced that those concessions were justified, and that they were worth the risk because the interim experience had proved that we had a worthy and reliable partner and neighbor.

Well, with the very first bomb exploding in a Jerusalem bus, and then the second, and then the third, and so on the house of Oslo collapsed in the minds of most Israelis, though not everyone was quick to admit it, even to himself.

I know that there could also be other interpretations; I heard at least from one person who was close to the late Yitzhak Rabin, that he, Rabin, being, after all, a person who knew about security more than many other people, would have rethought the process at some stage or another; but there is no way to verify that.

I don't have the time to go in detail into the disappointments and frustrations the Palestinians had in connection with Oslo, especially in the economic field, with the standard of living in parts of the "territories" declining by 40-50 percent since Oslo, though in the last year and especially in the past few months there have been significant improvements but suffice it to say that many Palestinians, hearing what their leaders told them at the time of the signing of Oslo, must have believed that full sovereignty with a capital in Jerusalem, a more or less total Israeli withdrawal from the "territories", dismantling the settlements perhaps even the "right of return" were almost a "given" with the result that "Oslo" backfired also on the Palestinian leadership."

One more thing about Oslo:

You know, in preparing this lecture, I looked up in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary the word "devoted". It says "devoted" means affectionate, fond, loving. I also looked up "committed" it means being bound to a pledge. So if I were a private person, and not the Ambassador, I would perhaps have put it like that: I wouldn't say that my government is devoted to the Oslo agreements that we are affectionate, fond or loving towards it but I shall say unequivocally that we are committed to it. I know that committed also means to be consigned to an institution for the insane, but though some on the Right may think so, this is not what I meanÉWe comply with it and we expect the other side to comply with it. There are things we don't like, many things in my view but Oslo was democratically approved and is legally binding, at least as long as the other side lives up to it. But it is also our right and duty, as a government, to correct the errors of the past in order to prevent the pitfalls of the future. That is what Israel is trying to do now and will continue to insist upon in the future.

So let's move on to the present.

As you may remember under the Oslo interim agreement, the Palestinians and Israel had certain reciprocal responsibilities. We believe, by and large, that we have lived up to our responsibilities, and certainly those entered into under last year's Hebron Agreement. The Palestinians have not. I think there can be no dispute that factually this is so. There may be controversies why they have not lived up to their commitments, but not about the facts.

Now, Israel and the United States and by the way, this was a procedure proposed by President Clinton wanted to create some sort of procedure like a balance-sheet, or a check list one column showing Israel's implementations, the other what the Palestinians ought to do. O.K. Israel accepted that though there is a built-in asymmetry in this procedure for while Israel's steps were very tangible, land the Palestinians' undertakings were mostly intangible promises; promises many of which have remained unfulfilled ever since the days of the late Yitzhak Rabin. Nevertheless, we decided to accept, though it was clear to us that almost every item in the Palestinian column of this "balansheet" or "check list" could be reversible, while ours are not. Anyway, without going, for obvious reasons, into the minutiae of the matters, we deem imperative, and so I believe does the US, that the substance and the timing of the Palestinian responsibilities must include such very significant steps as, for instance: seriously, effectively combating terrorist organizations "100 percent effort" as the President has said not the usual "revolving door" games. And this must include dismantling terrorist infrastructures which used to be, and probably still are, thriving in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority. And this would also, of course, have to include the question how to deal with terrorists or suspected terrorists. The there is the matter of illegal weapons not just those which are there now, but also how to prevent smuggling of additional weapons; there is the matter of the Palestinian Police Force, not only whose size contravenes the Oslo agreements, but which for some reason looks more like an army than a bunch of traffic-wardens; there is the need for full, genuine, complete bilateral security cooperation between the sides something the Palestinians have stopped contrary to "Oslo"; and last but not least there are two related subjects related not only in fact, but also in spirit: To nullify, to do away with, to abolish never mind the terminology the Palestinian charter which calls for our destruction and whatever anybody may say or try to explain away the Palestinian side has not been consistent with its obligation given in the PLO's exchange of letters with the Government of Israel in September of 1993. That the Palestinians have not lived up to their commitment in this respect has now been publicly confirmed, as I understand, by no less a person than Ron Pundak, one of the principal architects of the "Oslo" agreements. And if I may be allowed a side remark it is a pity that for a time our American friends were misled on this that the covenant had supposedly gone the way of all flesh while in fact, it has not. Now, one could say: So what, after all, it's only a piece of paper, or: Arafat may find it difficult to get the approval of the Palestinian National Council to cancel the Charter. Maybe, but we are not convinced by these arguments though if there is progress on the other matters, as I said before, we might show flexibility with regards to the procedures of abolishing the covenant. But let me recount to you something: Last week Sharansky was in town, and you know his background he said to his American interlocutor: "For me to believe in peace with someone who doesn't even want, or is incapable of, annulling a constitution which calls for my destruction is something I cannot accept." That's also where the matter of incitement and black-propaganda comes in and that's another point on the agenda: for what chance is there for future Jewish and Arab generations to live in peace if the Palestinian official, and certainly officially-controlled media, and educators, continue to call for Jihad, disseminate anti-Semitic propaganda, hail a holocaust-denier like Garaudy, and tell children about returning to Jaffa, or Haifa or Acre?

O.K., but what about Israel's further redeployments? It is here where reciprocity comes into the picture a term we want and insist to be taken seriously especially in the light of the past; again I won't go into details, but the principle of the matter is that there'll be something called a "timeline" which will spell out exactly what should happen in week so-and-so, what happens in week so-and-so and so on and so forth till, to use the example of the balance sheet once again, the balance sheet balances at the bottom line. We, and the US, believe that this is a good procedure, or better to say: the best procedure under the present circumstances which are not terribly auspicious anyway because, among other things, insufficient mutual trust.

So that's what the present situation is really all about but, unfortunately, we haven't gotten around to that yet maybe we will now but as the Prime Minister said on Friday: "in order to engage you got to engage."

Now, I won't use examples from the field of sports, and I don't know anything about tennis anyway except that some players always seem to be angry at the refereeÉBut, I will try to spell out, as well as I can, what the situation in the Palestinian-Israeli talks was last week. Of course, I am fully aware of the fact that by the time we are finished here this might change, actually I hope it will change but that was the situation:

But first I think we should remind ourselves that it is the Palestinians who broke off the talks I think 16 months ago and under one pretext or another refused to resume them until two weeks ago.

Let me just say here that if they, the talks, did start again, and if, hopefully, they will reach an agreement neither could have happened, or will happen, without the facilitation of the US; and all concerned, especially Secretary Albright, have worked very hard on this. But, unfortunately facilitation does not always succeed especially if the sides sometimes draw the wrong conclusions from even the best-intentioned efforts of the facilitators.

And, while the Israeli Government, and especially the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, have gone out of their way, not only the "extra mile", but also the "extra percent", to engage the Palestinian side, to make progress, to reach an agreement as soon as possible so far this has been to little avail. I am certain that the Administration has not been sitting on its hands either but, it still remains to be seen if there will be concrete results in moving the talks in the right direction.

The gap, between the sides, if you can even call it a gap, is as narrow as can be believe me, it could be bridged within a few days, perhaps even hours. Not to reach agreement would be a tragedy as it would, undoubtedly have unfortunate consequences primarily for the Palestinian people.

I want you to know, that contrary to what you may hear, Israel did put some concrete proposals on the table even in the initial meetings headed by Yitzhak Mordechai and Abu-Mazen and then in subsequent talks of lower-level teams. These proposals may not have been all the Palestinians wanted but they were definitely forthcoming proposals. Just to explain why is the 3% of the territory different from the remaining 10%? and don't get me wrong, also with the 10% Israel would be taking serious security risks but these 3% are places which are adjacent to Jewish civilian populations, very close by or military training grounds and obviously we need to have some input into what will or will not happen there. So, we want to fix now who would be responsible for planning and zoning and how are decisions to be implemented or not to be implemented. Interestingly, actually, the impression which Mordechai got in the first meeting was that there was some give and take but you know what happened after that: the Palestinians announced that nothing had been achieved, that the whole thing had broken down and that all they actually wanted to hear from the Israelis was a "Yes" or "No" to the US ideas which they, the Palestinians said they had accepted in principle.

Now, it is not for me to second-guess American Diplomacy but I believe that I can interpret pretty well what the Palestinians believe American Diplomacy to be. Believe wrongly, I should add. In politics in general, perceptions count for a great deal but especially in the Middle East. Over the last few months there has been an aura of atmospheric turbulence in the US-Israeli relationship often exaggerated by not always completely disinterested parties here, there, everywhere. The Palestinian perception clearly was and is erroneously all along, I believe that they just could sit back and wait whether for Israel to sign on the dotted lineÉor, witness a major blow-up in the US-Israeli relationship which is seen by some in the Palestinian camp as even preferable to an arrangement. None of this, of course, is going to happen but thiswas, perhaps still is, the Palestinian perception of some of the statements coming out of Washington let alone Europe. "So why be flexible?" they say to themselves. "Why even seriously engage? American pressure is going to do the job for us." Well, they are wrong, wrong again as they have been wrong historically on almost any opportunity to come to agreements with us during most of this century. More the pity, as not only is Israel intent on trying to achieve agreements, even though everybody understands that this would incur difficult compromises on her part but even more so, as only a center-right government such as we have today, in spite of a great many coalition problems, has a chance to make such an agreement acceptable to a majority of the Israeli people.

Allow me here a short digression: What this in effect amounts to, and I may be criticized at home for saying this, is that a Likud-led government would adopt a profound historical, ideological change of attitude towards the Palestinians' role in parts of the Land of Israel. This is not an easy decision to make and I sometimes feel that there is insufficient understanding, certainly insufficient credit accorded to Netanyahu in this and other countries in this respect. Nor, may I add, is there perhaps sufficient appreciation, even in Israel itself, that, after all, the decisions which will be made by Netanyahu, or any Israeli government, in the next few months and years may be the most fateful for future generations any Israeli leader since Ben-Gurion had to take.

I have been told that some people around Mr. Arafat may actually have advised him not to come to agreements with the Israeli Government under any circumstances as this would supposedly leave him free to act come May 1999. It does not and I can only say that I hope he doesn't follow such foolish advice. Frankly, I think that the Palestinian perception of the present American initiative is mistaken also on substance, I mean, America never intended, nor will it in the future, want to dictate to the sides what they have to do I refer you to the various recent statements of all American personalities including the President, the Secretary, their staffs, their spokespersons it's the two sides who have to come to an agreement with each other, not with Washington. There is an American initiative, yes including some important, pertinent details but only some; it's like one of these pencil drawings where the colors have to be put in and it is for the sides to agree on the colors one could call it the modalities, which are needed to implement the American initiative. Israel is willing to do just that, the Palestinians last week said "No". American Diplomacy, I have no doubt, may and certainly should, now make a concerted effort to disabuse those erroneous perceptions on the Palestinian side. Otherwise an important chance to make progress may be missed once again.

Having said that, I would also like to add that we would never have been able to make progress towards peace at all, or make certain decisions nor would the Arab side, not just the Palestinians, have given much thought to peace in addition to other factor had it not been for the fact that 1) the US recognizes that what is at stake is the very security of Israel and the Israeli people; and 2) that the US also recognizes, and declares, that its commitment to Israel's security is and will continue to be ironclad. In this context, although this is not the issue we are talking about today but America's stated and proven ironclad commitment to Israel's security gives me an opportunity to thank this country for what it has done and is doing in this respect and beyond that, to cite once again the importance of America's commitment to Israel's qualitative edge lest it be eroded by military supplies to some of our neighbors.

But to get back to our main subject today No less significant, perhaps for the chances of achieving agreement on the "permanent status" will be for America to continue making it unequivocally clear to the Palestinians that any unwarranted acts on their part, such as a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, would encounter America's firm opposition based on its policy, expressed verbally as well as in writing, that it will not support such an illegal act by the Palestinians. I know there are those, perhaps even on both sides, who would welcome Mr. Arafat disregarding the procedures set out in the agreements he has signed for opposite reasons, of course but the only way to determine the exact and agreed status of the areas which already are, and those which will be controlled by the Palestinian Authority and the only way to assure that the Palestinian people residing in these areas will be able to live and prosper in peace is through negotiations with Israel not through precipitate unilateral acts. And I shall not go into the question of the "permanent status" now one hurdle at a time though, obviously, this is the main issue.

By the way, I understand that my friend Amru Moussa , who recently spoke at this Institute, said that "normalization" was an Israeli invention. Maybe it is, I don't know, but in my view normal relations between countries which are at peace should be something natural which don't need inventing by anyone especially talking about Egypt whose great late visionary leader, President Sadat paid the ultimate price for battling for peace and for establishing normal relations with Israel.

Time is running out I mean my lecture, not just peace but just a few words about some of our other neighbors. I have read all sorts of unfounded rumors about the Israeli-Syrian track. All I shall say is that Israel is calling for a resumption of peace-talks without pre-conditions on the part of either side. By the way, have you noticed that President Assad is not totally devoid of a sense of humor when he recently visited Paris he made a point of praising there "the values of liberty and equality," which brings me to Lebanon though the Lebanese, of course, may be forgiven for not being amused by President Assad's statement about liberty and, at any rate, I suppose they find it difficult to understand why, while Israel calls for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425, which would bring about a withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Southern Lebanon which at least some of them supposedly want provided, as this resolution clearly states, there will be satisfactory security arrangements the Syrians hold the Lebanese hostage to their own calculations while some of our and America's best friends unfortunately support them in this position.

As to Jordan I will only say that it has proved to be a reliable and genuine partner in peace while all concerned, including perhaps the US and I know Israel is going to make greater efforts should do everything in their power to give the Jordanian people more tangible peace-dividends than they feel they have received so far.

And I shall have to conclude my remarks on a more somber note: I realize that an Israeli Ambassador is expected to say something about last week's Iranian missile test and there is more to come. We weren't surprised our long time warnings have been vindicated although we were often accused of crying wolf. But this is not yet the end of the story and there will be other tests, probably also of more advanced missile types. Right now it could be principally Israel and Turkey which are at risk though not immediately, and anyway, it is difficulty to say what "right now" means. And, of course, Saudi-Arabia and other Arab states are also not far away. A few years down the road, a more advanced generation of Iranian missiles could easily reach parts of Western Europe. And there are the other rogue states, Iraq, Libya, Syria Syria to remind you, is feverishly working on enhancing its already highly advanced chemical warfare capabilities. As to Iran, the US deserves a great deal of praise for taking decisive steps to curtail, even at this late date, cooperation between Russian companies with Iran on Missile technology but under no circumstances may anyone igrecent warnings by the commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld that most of the Western world, including the United States, could within a relatively short time be exposed to the threat of long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear or biological and I would add chemical warheads specifically singling out Iran and Iraq. The Israeli, I should say US-Israeli, "arrow" is certainly one very important answer. But other answers will be needed too. Though, Palestinians were dancing on their roofs when Iraqi Scuds hit Israel, they should perhaps realize now that unconventional weapons will not easily distinguish between Zones A, B, or C or between Arab and Jew living in close proximity so maybe they will realize that perhaps now is the time to come to an agreement and to present a common front against the threats facing all of us in the region.