National Press Club Briefing with
Ambassador Shoval
December 19, 1991 |
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB BRIEFING WITH AMBASSADOR SHOVAL
Washington, D.C. - December 19, 1991
ED SCHAEFER: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to welcome you
all to today's National Press Club Morning Newsmaker. I'm Ed Schaefer,
a member of the Morning Newsmaker committee. Today's guest is the
Honorable Zalman Shoval, Israel's ambassador to the United States.
Ambassador Shoval is with us to discuss the recently concluded Mideast
peace talks. And hopefully provide an incite into where do we go from
here. The ambassador has had a distinguished career in government. He
served in the Knesset for over a decade, and was a member of Israel's
delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. Outside of government
he worked as a leading economist specializing in banking and finance.
Ambassador Shoval is a graduate of the universities of California and
Geneva, Switzerland. Earning advanced degrees in political science and
international relations. Welcome to the National Press Club Mr.
Ambassador.
AMB. SHOVAL: Thank you very much Mr. Schaefer. Good morning. I welcome
you in this cold weather. Ladies and gentlemen, let me say at the very
start that these 10 days or so which we just passed in Washington were
in my view very valuable 10 days, and I am referring especially to the
Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian part of it. The negotiations with the
Syrians and Lebanese are different with regard to Syria they are still,
I must say grave doubts, how interested Syria really is in peace with
Israel, or to put it a different way, whether Syria, with its internal
dictatorial makeup can really afford to make peace with Israel, but that
remains to be seen. Talks have started. Hopefully they will continue.
With the Lebanese, well I was not part of the Israelis delegation
meeting with the Lebanese, but the feeling was that had the Syrians not
watched over them, Israel and Lebanon could have reached a peace
agreement within half a day.
The atmosphere was very friendly. With regards to the Jordanian-
Palestinian-Israeli part of this process, let me say that we exchange
during peace days of corridor talks on the sofa many drafts of
agreements. We agreed on a formula of continuation. We agreed to go on
the Seventh of January, although the place, the venue, has not yet been
agreed upon, but I would suppose that if we shall be successful in
establishing direct links of communication as we have tried ever since
Madrid unsuccessfully, unfortunately, it will be easier to agree also on
the next venue, and what is more importantly of course, on the venue
after the next meeting, how to go on, where to go on.
This matter of direct communication is very, very important. Many of
the difficulties which were ahead of this meeting could have been
avoided had we talked to each other. Unfortunately all the Arab parties
refused to return our calls. And I think -- let me say I hope that that
difficulty will be overcome now with regard to Dr. Alshockey (ph.), the
head of the Palestinian component of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian
delegation. We did exchange telephone numbers which was a symbolic act,
because of course Dr. Alshockey (ph.) is in the Israeli telephone book.
There would be no difficulty in getting that number. But it's
symbolically important that the numbers were exchanged, with regard to
the governments, Jordanian and so on and so forth, they are still
waiting for the decision of their respective governments whether we can
establish a link perhaps through the embassies here in Washington.
It would be important, I am stressing this again, to have this direct
communication because then we could perhaps avoid some of the
preliminaries before we actually meet. And I believe that could be
important for the progress of the talks. Let me say very clearly that
these 10 days were not a waste of time. And the talks in the corridors
on the sofa were not just about procedures. Because of course
procedures, when you talk about an issue as intricate, as long standing,
as emotionally difficult as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a conflict
which has gone on for 100 years or so, sometimes procedure leads to
substance, and each side is understandably concerned not to take steps
which could prejudice the continuation of the outcome of these
negotiations, but there was a good feeling between the members of the
delegations. One of the Palestinians offered his prayer beads to one of
the members as a present to one of the members of the Israeli delegation
as a souvenir. I said to Dr. Alshockey (ph.), who is a medical doctor,
doctor if we stay here much longer, I'll need you as a doctor.
He said, I may need a doctor myself. We could almost have had peace by
exhaustion. Now, where do we stand, or where did we stand at the end of
these talks? Let me say, we were so close, that close. And if I can
show this graphically or plastically, I think, although I am not
objective, it was Israel moving like that, more than the other side.
Now, we had differences of opinion, as you know, but I think that the
basic factor in creating difficulties was that there was an attempt on
the part of the Palestinians basically to change the ground rules of
this whole process. Now, nothing of course is sacred. But president --
Secretary Baker during his eight month of traveling back and forth to
the Middle East, in a very diligent manner, a very earnest manner, very
hard working fashion, set out these rules which of course are predicated
upon everybody making some compromises. There were things we didn't
like. There were things they didn't like. But at the end of the day,
these were rules. And without rules, a complicated process like that
has not chance of taking off, of going on, certainly not of leading to
any sort of fruitful conclusion, and because there has been some
conclusion, let me just quote to you. In the agreed letter of
invitation sent by the sponsors, United States and the Soviet Union, it
says very distinctly and clearly, Palestinians will be invited and
attend as part of the join Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
Furthermore it says, with respect to negotiations between Israel and
Palestinians, who are part of the joint delegation. Now, the
Palestinians who perhaps in Madrid or after Madrid, for reasons I don't
want to go into, thought that they can change these rules retractably,
try to create new facts on the ground so to say here in Washington, but
let me say that and this may perhaps be a surprise to some, we had
really solved mainly thanks to Israel's spirit of compromise and
flexibility most of the problems.
The problems with regard to the schedule of meetings between the joint
delegation and between the separate tracks which derive from the joint
delegation, one track for the Palestinian issues pertaining to the self
government arrangements, the other track to the Jordanian-Israeli
bilateral issues. And we had reached agreement on that. What we had
not reached agreement on, was the exact numerical proportion in each
track and in each delegation.
Again referring to the ground rules, and to the defacto situation in
Madrid, we the Israeli delegation, 14 members were facing across the
table, 14 members. Half and half. Seven Jordanians, seven Palestinians.
They now want to double their number, meaning that Israel would face
across the table, 28 members in order to establish the fact of a
separate Palestinian entity all along the process, not just defacto but
also deregula (ph.). And this is something we could not accept, do not
accept, and I must say that the American sponsors back our position on
that, because these were the agreements and these were the rules.
Now, and I would like to perhaps mention or say at this opportunity,
that we commend the US for not letting itself be provoked to interfere
at this stage of the process, because this could have derailed the
process from the very outset and it would have reinforced the perception
among some of the Arabs, a wrong perception that peace has to be
negotiated with the United States and not with Israel, that is a wrong
perception. That is not the way the United States sees it. And of
course it is not the way Israel sees it.
Now I mentioned before that we had approached, we have actually reached
agreement on the main issue and we would have wished that we could have
concluded this round of talks in Washington by saying so we have agreed,
A, B, C, D, and only one issue remains. But unfortunately the other
side did not agree to that either, because perhaps for negotiating
tactics, for reasons of negotiating tactics, they said, this is a
package, and unless we agree on the package, we cannot single out the
agreements, although, as I said some other place, these were four fifths
of the issues. And I would much rather have said four fifths of the
glass is full. Instead of saying one fifth is empty. Now I mentioned
before the necessity of direct links, direct communications, and I am
saying this not just as a matter of principle, although there is a
matter of principle involved. Perhaps we can find a way to communicate
between now and the Seventh of January and settle these remaining
questions so that when we meet again on the Seventh of January,
wherever, we can directly go to substance.
The day before yesterday, President Bush very forcefully, very
earnestly, urged all sides to move from procedure to substance. I was
there with Foreign Minister Levy (ph.) when he said that and he then
conveyed that message I understand to the Arab parties, and let me say,
we Israel, fully concur. We tried to move the talks to proposals of
substance from day one. Unfortunately we were rebuffed on the pretext
that first we had to agree to the split up of the delegation into the
separate groups, or into the separate tracks, and although as I said
before we did agree in principal and then we actually agreed on a final
formula, all these days from that point of view were wasted as far as
substance is concerned. But we hope to say that we will be able to start
with substance when we meet again. Unfortunately we sometimes have the
feeling that the Palestinians have internal problems. Maybe they feel
they are watched by the eye of Big Brother, whether their big brother is
the PLO or the Syrians, or whoever. And we see different, I would say,
expression among the Palestinians of where we go, how quickly we go, and
the unfortunate result, of course, is that when they reach a consensus,
the consensus is usually based on the lowest common denominator and not
on the highest common denominator.
Ladies and gentlemen, what we offer the Palestinians is without any
doubt, less than what they would have wanted to achieve. What we offer
to the Palestinians would also result in Israel achieving less than some
of us, or most of us, would have wanted to achieve. That is the nature
of compromise. And compromise has to be a two-way street.
Yes, we do not talk about the creation of another state. That is very
clear. That is not part of the outline of the terms of reference of this
process. But we do offer the Palestinians in the territory most of what
they want. And certainly a lot more than the Turks or the British or
the Jordanians or the Egyptians ever offered them in the past.
And we do not do this out of the goodness of our heart. And we don't do
this as a favor to them. First of all, we have no desire to be over
lords. We have no desire to rule over another people. But there is
more involved. We have a very strong interest -- I would say an
egotistical interest -- to solve the problem of the Palestinians to the
territories. Because it is we who have to live with them. It is we who
are going to co-exist with the Palestinian Arabs for all time.
So, we do have a stake in that. And we have an interest in solving it.
So, we say to the Palestinians, in the delegation, and outside of the
delegation and directly, and indirectly. We appeal to the Palestinians.
Up till now, they have always rejected our out stretched hands. At
least four times in the last seven years, as I mentioned most recently
up in Camp David. We can wait. We have (the faith?). We are building
it up. We are making progress. Many problems, we are overcoming them.
Time is not working in our disfavor. The Jordanians have this faith.
Governments, parliaments. The Palestinians have to hurry. The
Palestinians should not waste time. The Palestinians should come and
negotiate with us. What is realistic? And I certainly hope that the
Palestinians will not want to get unjustified. And by Eban's famous
saying that they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
Thank you very much. This was my opening statement. I would now like
to take questions, comments.
Q: Jeraro Cardenos (ph.) with the Mexican News Agency. If there is this
willingness from your part to negotiate with the Palestinians, is there
also willingness on January 7 to discuss some kind of a (meddling?) of
the ground rules. To discuss separately with the Palestinians,
especially if the talks will be held closer to home -- somewhere in the
Middle East?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, I think you made a good point. Any change in the
ground rules has to be mutually accepted. Now, if at sometime in the
future, it will turn out that some of these rules -- that one or another
one -- has to be changed for the mutual benefit of the different
parties, maybe we, maybe they will consider it. But right now, these
rules have to go on. Also, as I've said before, for practical reasons.
The factors in Palestine -- all of Palestine, including Jordan -- are so
interwoven, intertwined, you cannot cut them up with a sharp knife. And
therefore, I think the idea of having a joint delegation is a sound
idea, whatever the political outcome of these negotiations will be.
Q: My name Oleya (ph.), I'm from Voice of Kuwait. And you said the
Palestinians and the Arabs do not want a peace talk to be very fast.
And then your trying to make it fast because it's for the Palestinians
interests.
So, what do you think about what happened during the Peace Talk in
Sedoin (ph.) and the Kescus (ph.) and the Medlin (ph.) and the other
cities in the West Bank. They were curfews, you know, they were any bad
situation. How do you explain that?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, first of all, I would like to commend Kuwait on not
voting against repeal of the Zionist racism resolution in the UN. We
were very sorry to see, by the way, that the three countries with which
we are negotiating peace: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, voted against repeal.
I would say almost putting their fist in the eye of President Bush who
had very clearly said that the resolution of Zionism -- equating Zionism
with racism -- really the denial, I'm quoting President Bush, denying
Israel's right to exist.
How are you going to talk peace with a country which denies your right
to exist? But coming to the specific question. Maybe, I'm speculating,
maybe the Palestinians, Jordanians, Syria believe that by dilly
dallying, by dragging their feet, by creating a crisis or a perception
of crisis -- even is there is no crisis -- they can drag the American
sponsors into the process with the hope that America will put pressure
in Israel. The saying used to be in the Arab world: deliver Israel.
This will not happen. The American's have made this very clear, that
this will not happen. Therefore, my feeling was, at least among the
Palestinians, that they have doubts about their own tactics, their own
strategies. You had the feeling that some of the members of the
Palestinian delegation did not want to say no to us. And therefore, I
am still basically hopeful about the continuation of the process when we
start again on the seventh of January. Now, I would like to say in a
very general fashion: violence is not helpful to the peace process.
Intifada is a negation of the peace process. You are not negotiating
peace under the threat of a gun. You are not negotiating peace when
terrorism goes on.
Q: We don't -- the Palestinian's do not have guns on the West Bank. No,
we have stones.
AMB. SHOVAL: Are you Palestinian or Kuwaiti? You must make up your
mind, now.
Q: Yeah. I am.
AMB. SHOVAL: You must make up your mind, now --
Q: No, I'm Palestinian --
AMB. SHOVAL: Oh, so did you say Kuwaiti --
Q: I'm working for a Kuwaiti newspaper.
AMB. SHOVAL: I see, right.
Q: No, I'm working for the Kuwaiti newspaper.
AMB. SHOVAL: Okay, fine. Now we got that settled. The Kuwaitis and
Palestinians, -- you're all together. I can see.
Q: Yeah, we are Arabs, you know.
AMB. SHOVAL: Okay.
Q: Whatever happens, you know, we are Arabs.
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, if you're all Arabs, why do you need a separate
Palestinian state? You've got to make up your minds. But anyway,
anyway --
Q: Well, Kuwait has Kuwait and Iraq has Iraq and --
AMB. SHOVAL: I'm sorry, I think you wanted to raise a question, I'll
answer to that. Violence has to stop. Hundreds and hundreds of
Palestinians were murdered by fellow Palestinians during the Intifada.
Why? Because they wanted to live in peace with Israel. This is
something which has to stop.
Now, there are extremists on both sides. On your side, also on our
side. The best way to stop extremists in their tracks is by making
progress on peace.
Q: I'm not sure you totally answered the basic thrust of that ladies
question. I'm Jim Anderson of (GTA?).
Let me paraphrase it. The Palestinian spokeswoman said that these talks
do not exist in a vacuum. That's what is happening here is affected by
what's happening elsewhere. Particularly in the West Bank. And she
suggested that these evictions in Sedoin (ph.) and the very harsh
curfews in Ramallah and Perev (ph.) were not coincidental. They are in
fact, perhaps a symptom of what you described as a lack of consensus
within the Palestinians that that same kind of lack of consensus exists
on the Israeli side.
The point being that it appeared to them that these actions, together
with Prime Minister Shamir's statement that the Israeli delegation did
not have a mandate to negotiate any substance during this session in
Washington, suggested to them that the Israeli's were not coming here in
good will. I think that's the thrust of what she was asking.
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, anybody can have anybody's guess, of course. From
day one, from day one -- I reiterate that -- we wanted to talk about the
agenda. The agenda means substance, of course. What does the agenda
mean? When do we have breakfast, when do we have lunch? The
Palestinian's refused to talk about the agenda. That means they refused
to talk about substance in the joint delegation.
All before we accepted the split-up. Now, consensus or not, Israel is a
state of law, is a democracy and what the government decides holds. And
the Israeli delegation here came with very clear instructions to make
progress. And the proposals which we handed over to the other side --
and nobody will be able to deny this -- even on the Palestinian side,
were very forth coming. And therefore, I am more hopeful than
pessimistic, basically. If the Palestinian's and the Jordanian's really
decide that the way to achieve a settlement is with us and not with
somebody else -- that is the pre-condition.
Q: Well, excuse me, you didn't answer the part about Prime Minister
Shamir's statement that the delegation had no mandate to negotiate
substance.
AMB. SHOVAL: The Israeli delegation had proposed from the very first
moment on, and that's a fact. And I say it again, you can ask anybody
on the Palestinian side to discuss the agenda with concrete proposals.
Q: -- (off mike) -- why did President Bush ask Mr. Levy to get into
substance?
AMB. SHOVAL: He didn't asked Mr. Levy, he asked all the sides. And as I
had an opportunity to say still in the White House, you express our
view. We wanted that from day one. But as the famous saying goes, you
need two to tango. Now, in the Middle East, we don't dance the tango,
we dance the death count. You need more than two -- six, seven, eight,
I don't know. And that's the problem: for the Arabs to get their act
together. I hope they will overcome that difficulty.
Q: Linda Scherzer with CNN. Mr. Ambassador, you said that you have
grave doubts about Syria's intentions about making peace with you. If
that's true, what is the reason that you are continuing these talks? If
the gap is so wide, why -- do you think the Syrians are coming back?
Why are you coming back to talk with them, and how are you going to
communicate with them about the time and the venue for the next round of
negotiations?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, we are coming back because we, contrary to the
Palestinians, will never miss an opportunity not to miss an opportunity
of peace. We have tried that all these times, all these years.
Why do the Syrians come back? Well, I can only guess. The Syrians have
lost their Soviet patron. The Syrians have to put themselves in a
better relationship with the West and, principally, with the United
States for economic reasons, for other reasons -- political reasons.
And I don't think that the Syrians are very eager to annoy the United
States.
In Madrid, it was touch and go. They tried not to have even the first
meeting with us. But even the other Arabs -- Saudi Arabia, Prince
Bandar, who was there, and the Americans probably put pressure on the
Syrians not to break up
this process before it even started. I don't know how it will
continue.
Now, the third part of your question: we also proposed to the Syrians
that the Syrian ambassador in Washington would communicate with the
Israeli ambassador in Washington. Whether that will work out or not, I
wouldn't put too much money on that, but who knows?
Q: When do you expect, though, that these talks are going to continue?
Not --
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, we have said -- I mean, we have agreed, not we have
said. The date -- the proposed date was the 7th of January for all
delegations, and we have agreed with that, so if there are no further
delays, that will happen. That will be the 7th of January.
Q: Jeffrey Winograd from Focus Israel Newsletter. Mr. Ambassador,
there are rumors that have been circulating Washington for weeks that
the United States government is considering removing Syria from the list
of states which sponsor terrorism. How would your government respond if
the American government took such an action?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, I personally think that the American government will
not do that, nor would the American Congress allow that or the American
public. And I refer you to the New York Times article the day before
yesterday about the situation in Syria. I mean, removing Syria from the
terrorist list would, of course, be preposterous.
Q: Do you have a venue in mind for January 7?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, you know that Israel's long-standing position is we
should move these talks to the region. It would be good. It would be
good. It would be good for all parts, for all sides. It would be good
for us for logistical reasons. It's very difficult for us. The more --
the closer we are to home, the quicker the process will be because if we
are close to the region, we could have a meeting once a week or once
every two weeks. If we are in Washington or some other place far away,
the delegation could stay here for a week, 10 days, would have to go
home for a number of weeks, and the whole process would be slowed down.
Maybe also there is a greater willingness now or -- I don't want to
speak the name of the Arab delegations, but there may be a greater
understanding that their insistence of Washington was really, I would
say, misplaced. Maybe the Palestinians thought that in Washington, PR
exposure would give them an extra advantage, or perhaps they believed
that the closeness or the nearness of the American government would play
a role in that, but I don't see the opposition as adamant as it was in
the past to moving eventually to the region. That's also the American
position. That's also the American position. Hopefully, we can work
something out in that respect.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you a couple of questions somewhat apart
from the discussions that have been held in Washington. My name is Joe
Polakoff. I write for Jewish newspapers. First of all, let me ask you
whether or not the vote at the United Nations General Assembly the other
day was not a second declaration by the United Nations that Israel is a
sovereign state that was declared first of all in 1948. So, it's sort
of a second rebirth in the eyes of the world body, much more
overwhelming in the vote than it was in 1948.
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, that is one way of looking at it, and I would say not
a wrong way of looking at it. Of course, Israel is a sovereign state
with or without the United Nations. Israel has had its presence in that
part of the world for 4,000 years. Next year, we are going to celebrate
3,000 years to the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish
people. We are the only people who have been in that part of the world
without a break. No other people has ever had a state in that part of
the world except for the Jewish people. There never was a Palestinian
state or a state in Palestine on the land of Israel which was not a
Jewish state. So, we didn't really need the United Nations for all
that. But, with the United Nations reiterating their support for the
Zionist ideal, which is one of the great ideals in modern history of a
people, downtrodden, reestablishing their nationhood. I think you're
right. I think that the symbolic moral, very, very important.
Q: Let me ask you another question, if I may. There is some talk in
some parts of the press to the effect that the peace process that's now
taking place really results from the Intifada. And I was wondering
whether or not this is actually the case, or whether it wasn't -- there
weren't other developments, such as the collapse of the communist empire
and so on and so forth.
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, we can go into a philosophical, historical debate.
Of course, the Intifada did have something to do with it, a great deal.
Because Intifada among other things demonstrated a sense of frustration
on the part of the Palestinians in the territories with the fat cats in
Tunis, with the PLO, who had always told them, "Don't accept compromise.
Don't accept any negotiating process with the Israelis. Because, if you
hold out, you will get everything."
And they saw, in the territories, what the situation was. The economic
situation declined, deteriorated. There was a lot of violence. Lots of
Palestinians were killed, as I said before, mostly by fellow
Palestinians. And you had a growing sense, especially among the younger
generation of Palestinians in the territories, Palestinians and Israelis
will have to live together in that country forever. There are two
peoples there. Both of them have claims -- legitimate claims. They'll
have to compromise, not to fight each other. So indirectly, the Intifada
did have something to do with it. Of course, the Intifada should stop
now, because you cannot, as I said before, continue peace talks under
the threat of terrorism, and terrorism not just against Jews -- Israelis
-- but also against Palestinians who talk to us.
Q: (Name inaudible) -- from Middle East Broadcasting Center. And I'm
also a Palestinian who live under your democracy, Mr. Ambassador.
First of all, the Intifada have started to create something. I mean,
because of a lot of reasons, the Intifada started, because of a lot of
suffering of the people. It started not because people like to be a
terrorist and to --
AMB. SHOVAL: Of course. Of course.
Q: -- you know, it start because a lot of people live under pressure, a
lot of people suffer from occupation, and from -- I'm not saying that
all Jewish people are bad. I live in West Bank --
AMB. SHOVAL: I know. And there are lots and lots of good ones.
Q: -- and we live together. But all what we see -- I mean, all the
Jewish we see is a soldier, young soldier, carrying their guns and
shooting people. And when you talk about terrorists, Palestinian
killing Palestinian, mostly, that's not true, Mr. Ambassador.
AMB. SHOVAL: The numbers are there.
Q: Most of the Palestinians -- excuse me.
AMB. SHOVAL: One hundred sixty-eight were killed by fellow Palestinians
--
Q: Well, okay, but --
AMB. SHOVAL: -- since the beginning of this year alone.
Q: -- okay --
AMB. SHOVAL: The statistics are there.
Q: -- but how many --
AMB. SHOVAL: Look at the United States report on human rights --
Q: Well, how many -- how many --
AMB. SHOVAL: -- in the territories.
Q: But how many hundred of Palestinian were killed by Israeli, how many
houses demolished by Israeli, how many days of curfew by Israeli -- ?
Q: Do we need a debate here?
Q: Excuse me, sir.
Q: Look, we came here for a press conference --
Q: Excuse me sir.
AMB. SHOVAL: Okay --
Q: -- to ask questions, not to run propaganda.
Q: Well, I want to ask a question.
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, let's -- let's --
Q: Just put the question mark at the end, it will be a question.
Q: Okay. I am -- he can --
Q: I do have a time limit. Let's get through with this.
Q: Well, excuse me. I'm talking to him. He had time, so --
Q: Yes, I understand. But I'm taking your --
AMB. SHOVAL: That's all right. Look.
Q: I'm taking my time.
AMB. SHOVAL: That's all right.
Q: Well, okay, sir. I don't want to ask question.
Q: What is your question.
Q: No. Go ahead. It's okay. No, no. I don't have a question.
AMB. SHOVAL: Let me just make one remark. I really welcome the presence
of Arab journalists here. We had a problem. I don't know if you know
that. I'm sure you do. Our journalists, the Israeli journalists here
in Washington, interviewed Dr. Majali, the head of the Jordanian-
Palestinian -- Jordanian delegation. And I think -- and others -- and
members of the Palestinian delegation. None of the Jordanian
journalists were allowed to interview any Israelis.
Q: Who told you that?
AMB. SHOVAL: I tell you that, because we
Q: No, that's not true. No.
AMB. SHOVAL: -- we proposed to them, and they said --
AMB. SHOVAL: -- please --
Q: No, no, no -- some Jordanian journalists went to your press
conference --
AMB. SHOVAL: No, no, no --
Q: Yeah, that's true.
AMB. SHOVAL: There were two interviews set up with me that were
canceled. We then -- our press people, our press person is sitting
here, we invited Jordanian journalists to come and interview members of
the delegation; they said, "only through the Jordanian press office,"
and the Jordanian press office was never heard of again. The fact is,
look for one interview, you won't find one. MR. : I would like to hear
your question -- you say you did have.
Q: Well, I do have a question but I'm not saying propaganda, I'm saying
facts. Okay.
Q: Well, you decide and he decide -- not he. I mean, he's sitting like
me, so -- (Cross talk.)
Q: My question: You were saying that the Palestinian are the only people
who will lose and who are, you know --
Q: Because there is a Palestinian -- there is an Israeli state and there
is a Jordanian state, so who cares? But the Palestinian care -- because
they are looking for their identity, and this is what they want.
So no matter how long it take the talks -- I mean, what we want is a
state and are you going to give us a -- This is what -- the question.
My question is --
AMB. SHOVAL: There was a question.
Q: There was a question.
AMB. SHOVAL: There was a question. I will reply to it. Israel does not
intend to permit the creation of another state in the very, very narrow
-- you know how wide this whole country of Palestine is between the Sea
and the Jordan River? Probably much, much shorter than Connecticut
Avenue --
Q: But the --
AMB. SHOVAL: I'm sorry, no, no, no, I didn't interrupt you.
Now, there is not going to be a separate Palestinian state right -- if
you excuse the expression -- in our guts, 10 minutes from Tel Aviv, a
minute and a half from our only international airport, a second and a
half from the center of our capital. We're not going to permit that.
BUT, we have not said to the other side, once negotiations start on the
permanent status three years down the road, you're not allowed to bring
up your demand or your request for a Palestinian state. This is not
part of the process right now, because as you know, we are discussing
now interim self-government. That's the way it's being described and the
American government has also stated very clearly that America does not
support the creation of a separate or an independent Palestinian state.
You will come and talk to us about that. We will have our position; you
will have your position. We don't raise any preconditions for the
negotiating process. We have our views, but that's all.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, do you feel that the postponement of the $10 billion
loan guarantee has any effect on the peace talks, and what effect does
it have on the political and economic situation in Israel?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, the delay was unfortunate. We think -- we can't
prove it, but we think that the delay at the time increased the
intransigence especially of the Syrians because it was after the
announcement of the delay and after the controversy between us and the
administration here about the loan guarantee that the Syrians announced
that they will not participate in the multilaterals and that they do not
agree -- and they have not agreed until this very moment -- that the
declared aim of this process is peace treaties between Israel and Syria.
This appears in the other sets. It does not appear in that set. So I
think the influence was not fortunate.
Now that you mention that question -- I did not want to bring it up.
The President has declared there would be a delay. This is for the
American people, for the American government to decide. Our request is
there. The need is very urgent. The situation in the Soviet Union
could be potentially tragic. I don't think that refugees should be held
hostage to political squabbles or to political considerations on the
Arab side, putting pressure on America not to go ahead with that. We
think that would be unfortunate. So we do believe, we do hope that
request will be forthcoming.
And let me add to that, because there's a lot of misinformation about
that. We are not asking for one cent of American money. We are not
asking for one cent of the American budget -- or any cost to the
American taxpayer. As a matter of fact, if we compare -- if we judge by
the $400 million housing guarantee which we got last year, more than
$200 million of those funds raised under that guarantee were spent here
in the United States on raw materials, on finished products, creating a
lot of additional jobs in this country. I believe that if the $10
billion immigrants absorption guarantee will come forth, there will be a
lot of new job creating in this country for the benefit of both
countries.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, what happens if you do not get the loan guarantee?
AMB. SHOVAL: We will not sacrifice the security or life of any of our
Jewish brethren from the Soviet Union. It will create a much more
difficult economic and social problem in Israel, but we will not fail
them. I think we have all learned the lessons of the Holocaust when we
thought -- everybody thought -- there was more time on our hands. We
are not going to repeat that mistake.
Q: Can I follow on that subject? In a perfect world, there would be no
connection between these peace negotiations and the loan guarantee
consideration. We live in an imperfect world. To what extent do you
think the consideration of it will be influenced by what happens or
doesn't happen in these negotiations? And a corollary question: at any
point in this process, would Israel be willing to suspend further
expansion of the settlements?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, I hope that this basically humanitarian question --
and it is a basically humanitarian question -- and I would say that the
emigration of a million Soviet Jews after 70 years of repression and
persecution in the Soviet Union is one of the great miracles in this
century of the human spirit being able to overcome repression. And I
certainly hope these two things will not be linked. Now --
Q: To what extent do you think they are?
AMB. SHOVAL: -- with the world not being perfect, which I assume you
must be right on, there may be some who believe that, although this is a
humanitarian issue and though it would also probably enable Israel over
time to be less reliant on American foreign aid, maybe some people think
that there should be a connection. This is not the view we have heard
from the American administration.
And let me make one practical addition to that. This peace process,
even in the eyes of us optimists, is going to take a long time. Even
with the best of hopes, for instance, the negotiations on the
Palestinian interim self-government arrangements will take no less than
a year, in the best of circumstances. The other ones, with the Syrians,
who knows? So, this is not something which can be held up for such a
long time.
Q: (Off mike.)
AMB. SHOVAL: Oh, with regard to the settlements, Israel's position and
policy is well known about that. But let me perhaps elaborate and say
the question of the settlements is, of course, not the settlements; it
is the future of the territories. Now, the future of the territories is
going to come up in the third year of this process, according to the
precepts, according to the rules. This is disputed territory. If that
weren't a fact, if there were no fact of a dispute over these
territories, there would be no problem. So, we say we are going to be
there. We have a right to live there. We have 750,000 Arabs living in
Israel. There should be no apartheid situation where Jews will be
forbidden to live in the territories because they are Jews, whatever the
political formula will be. But the Palestinian side may have a
different opinion about that. That will come up in the third year of the
negotiations.
Let me -- you didn't ask that, but I will add something by my own -- on
my own initiative. People always say, "But Mr. Begin at the time agreed
to a three-month freeze on settlements." He did, but when? After the
signing of the Camp David agreements. After the signing. Not as a
precondition for negotiations. So, let's not forget that, either.
Q: You said that you're going to celebrate the 3,000 years of Jerusalem
as the capital and that you're talking about history today. And then
that means -- you know, the Arabs were in Spain for 700 years and that
we can claim Spain for us these days. What do you think of that?
And the second question is that how long the Soviet Jews have been
living in Israel, how many years, how many days, how many weeks? And
now they're becoming Israeli citizens.
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, the State of Israel, of course, was established,
among other things, or mainly to be a safe haven for persecuted Jews
from all over the world. That is the purpose of the State of Israel.
We didn't come there because we looked for oil or because we wanted to
exploit another people. We are not colonialists. We did not look to
build our economy on Arab labor.
Q: So that --
AMB. SHOVAL: Our -- I'm sorry. You must let me finish a sentence. The
Zionist forefathers made it a principle to establish our economy on our
own labor, which was not always easy, but we did that. Yes, every Jew
coming to Israel can automatically become an Israeli citizen. There are
22 Arab countries, Arab states in the world, and all the Arabs living in
Israel have completely equal rights with the Jews, except for one thing.
They do not have to serve in the army.
Q: Why?
AMB. SHOVAL: Why? Because they don't want to. They don't have to serve
in the army because they say, and we can understand that, if there is
another war and members of our own family, certainly of our own ethnic
group, are on the other side, we don't want to kill fellow Arabs. Okay.
We agree to that. So, our boys and girls serve for three years in the
army, cut their private or civilian life short by three years. The
Arabs in Israel do not. But they have completely equal rights --
judges, members of Knesset, everything. Some people say they have more
rights, but I don't accept that, necessarily. So, that is the
situation.
And once we come to an arrangement with the Palestinians in the
territories, it will be a future of coexistence, not of one side or the
other side excluding the other side. That's the only future for this
country which hopefully will come to peace one day.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, a follow-up to the loan guarantee question. Could
you explain to us exactly what has to happen, where the ball is now?
Does your government have to make a request? Does the Congress have to
do something, the administration?
AMB. SHOVAL: No. We have made our request as long as -- September ago -
- this September, and we look at the six point which were announced at
the time of the delay by the American government, meaning that the
President does not intend to request a further delay after the 120 days
are over.
Now the way the administration or Congress are going to deal with it are
an internal, American matter and we are not going to interfere or try to
interfere or express any opinion of that in any way. Any further
questions?
Q: Just one that still puzzles us after the talks are over. Given the
history of the Intifada and given the security concerns of Israel and
given the -- one would have thought the intent to encourage moderation
among the Palestinians, what's the calculation in allowing them to go
back basically with their credibility -- yeah, I'm Barbara Crosett (sp.)
from the New York Times, sorry I didn't say that -- to allow them to go
back with their credibility perhaps damaged because nothing was
achieved? Is there some sense that there may be -- that that might be -
- there may be some sort of backlash to that?
AMB. SHOVAL: Yes, I am afraid there may be, and I think that that
possibility is worrying the Palestinians in the delegation because what
will happen, those who are moderate, and I think that's the majority --
moderate is perhaps not the right word, but those who have understood
that they must come to some sort of accommodation with us will be
disappointed. The extremists will say, "Ah, we told you so."
So I think that is unfortunate and this may be the reason why in the
last few hours we had a feeling that there was some sense of regret that
they had insisted so much on these procedurals and not gone down to the
actual negotiations. But again, let's be optimistic and say that until
the 7th of January, it is a rather short break, it's two weeks or so,
they will work out their act in the meantime. Perhaps we will have
direct contacts with them through me or by any other venue or way in
between, and hopefully they will be able to say to their people, "Look,
this time was not wasted, we made some progress and we will start from a
higher plain once we start again on the 7th of January."
Q: Mr. Ambassador, if the Arab negotiators were to call you up or
representative of the Israeli government can say, "Hey, we agree to meet
on" -- they call directly and say, "We agree to meet on the 7th of
January but we want to do it in Washington," how would your government
respond?
AMB. SHOVAL: Well, I think my government would not make the place or the
venue an issue which would prevent the continuation of the talks. But
we would like at the same time to have the rapport, to have
communications with the Arab delegations about how and when we knew for
the follow up after the next meeting, even if it does take place in
Washington. I think that would be a very important point.
You know that on the 15th of November the Palestinians wrote a letter to
the Secretary of State, included in which there is a sentence, "We don't
want to have direct communications with the Israelis on any level. We
are going to communicate only with the sponsor." That was a very
unfortunate omen for the peace talks.
I think -- I hope anyway, that that lesson has been learned and that we
will have direct contacts. I think that would be very, very helpful.
Let me perhaps, sir, conclude in saying that I am especially happy to
have had the opportunity to meet two Arab journalists here, or perhaps
more than two, and I would certainly welcome the opportunity to continue
the dialogue, not just as journalists, but as Palestinians and Israelis.
Thank you very much.
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